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This research study explores how the nature and type of usability failures impact task
performance in a healthcare organization. Healthcare organizations are composed of
heterogeneous and disparate information systems intertwined with complex business
processes that create many challenges for the users of the system. The manner in which
Information Technology systems and products are implemented along with the
overlapping intricate tasks the users have pose problems in the area of usability.
Usability research primarily focuses on the user interface; therefore, designing a better
interface often leaves security in question. When usability failures arise from the
incongruence between healthcare task and the technology used in healthcare
organizations, the security of information is jeopardized. Hence, the research problem is
to understand the nature and types of usability-related security failures and how they can
be reduced in a Healthcare Information System.
This research used a positivist single case study design with embedded units, to
understand the nature and type of usability-related information systems security failures
in a Healthcare context. The nature and types of usability failures were identified
following a four-step data analysis process that used terms that defined (1) user failures in
a large healthcare organization, (2) Task Technology Fit theory, (3) the Confidentiality
Integrity and Availability triad of information protection that captured usability-related
information system security failures, and (4) by conducting semi-structured interviews
with users of the Healthcare Information System capturing and recording their
interactions with the usability failure.
The captured reported usability-related information system security failures
dated back five years within a healthcare organization consisting of a network of
128 medical centers. The evaluation of five years of data and over 8,000
problems reported by healthcare workers allowed this research to identify the
misalignment of healthcare task to the technology used, and how the
misalignment impacted both information security and user performance. The
nature of usability failures were centered on technical controls, however, the
cause of the failures was predominately information integrity failures and the
unavailability of applications and systems. Usability-related information system
security failures are primarily not recognized due to the nature of healthcare task
along with the methods healthcare workers use to mitigate such failures by

employing workarounds to complete a task. Applying non-technical security
controls within the development process provides the clearest path to addressing
throughout the organization the captured usability-related information system
security failures.
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Chapter 1
Introduction

1.1 Background
The healthcare industry faces well-recognized challenges such as high cost of
operations, inefficiencies, inadequate safety, and insufficient access to
information. Past and present United States Presidents have mandated
restructuring the healthcare industry to alleviate many of these current problems.
This has led to healthcare organizations becoming more connected through
Information Technology (IT) both locally and globally using heterogeneous and
disparate Health Information Systems (HIS) to access and share information.
These HIS consist of clinical, management, strategic decision support, and
electronic network and e-health applications (Austin & Boxerman, 2003). The
use of heterogeneous and disparate systems within the highly collaborative
healthcare environment can become problematic, creating usability failures when
applications and systems converge to retrieve, transport, and deliver information
between these systems (Bardram, 2005). Usability failures become an
organizational security issue when providing HIS users a means to access
information in a timely and secure manner (Braz & Robert, 2006). This research
focuses on understanding usability-related information systems security failures in
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a healthcare organization and how such failures impact IS security performance in
a healthcare organization.
For this research study, usability failures affect users in phases if left
untreated. The first phase is the initial failure from a user interaction (usability
failure) with an application or system. The first phase consists of the user’s
inability to access the application or system. For this research study, a usability
failure emanates from the user’s inability to access an application or system with
the sole purpose to obtain information to complete a task. The usability failure
could be driven by not remembering a password or it could be technical in nature.
The user will react to the failure and articulate the constraints that the failure has
caused. If left untreated, the usability failure creates the second phase—a
usability security failure. A usability security failure occurs when information
from the initial usability failure is not presented from the interface in a manner
that allows the user to take the necessary security precautions with the system
(Sheng, Broderick, Koranda, & Hyland, 2006; Whitten & Tygar, 1999). Usability
security failures are directly linked to IS security failures. For this research, an
information systems security failure is the most severe security failure, and it
primarily occurs when users of a system have to create alternative methods not
prescribed by the organization to complete an assigned task precipitated from
usability failures. The effects of the usability failure determines whether an
information systems security failure exists and the responses of the users can
further determine the types of security controls an organization has in place.
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In the areas of usability security, researchers primarily have evaluated
methods and techniques in designing secure user interfaces while improving the
human interaction with a computer system (Flechais, Mascolo, & Sasse, 2007).
However, usability security encompasses a great deal more, as Al-Ghatani and
King (1999) and Markus (1983) claim poor usability design evokes a greater
degree of user resistance. Greater user resistance, particularly in healthcare
settings, means users are likely to denigrate the system, sabotage the computer
equipment, tamper with the data, or abandon the new systems and continue to use
the old system (Worthley, 2000). Within a healthcare context, any of these
behaviors is at best undesirable and, at worst, may lead to the quality of patient
care to be questioned. Whitman (2004) identified and ranked technical software
failures or errors, deliberate acts of sabotage or vandalism, and technical hardware
failure or errors as threats to information security. These information security
threats are fallout from usability failures.
Bhattacherjee and Hikmet’s (2007) research on user physician resistance
reported that physicians at Cedars-Sinai hospital in Los Angeles, California,
rebelled against a new computerized physician order entry system, complaining
that the system distracted them from their medical duties, which ultimately led to
the removal of the system. The research findings suggested the resistance was
caused by the perceived threat of losing control over their work procedures. In
similar healthcare usability literature, Johnson, Johnson, and Zhang (2005) stated
that healthcare software developers often overlook relevant user characteristics,
user tasks, user preferences, and usability issues, resulting in systems that
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decrease productivity or simply remain unusable. Overlooking user needs in the
software development process can negatively impact the acceptance and use of a
newly implemented software or hardware system.
In healthcare organizations, the processes by which patient care is provided
are defined by the user task and user characteristics; therefore, productivity and
system availability become huge issues. When a user suffers from a failed
interaction with an application or a system interface from a poorly designed
business process prevents the user from a completing a task, the user will seek
other means to complete that task. Other means of completing a task are done by
the user circumventing established business processes and security controls
(Eckman, Bennett, Kaufman, & Tenner, 2007; Johnson & Willey, 2011). The
user behavior from the failed interaction is essentially the embarkation point on
the road towards a usability security failure.
A usability-related information systems security failure occurs when
information is unable to be accessed, delivered, mishandled, misinterpreted, or is
altered by the user from a failed interaction with an application or system. The
failed interaction may cause the user to intentionally or unintentionally violate the
organization’s security policies to complete a task. Information that is unable to
be properly protected from user interactions have been researched under the
technical domain of IT security, i.e., encryption, data, software and hardware
controls (Anderson, 1972; Sandhu, Coyne, Feinstein, & Youman, 1996; Schneier,
1996). This researcher argues that focusing specifically on technical aspects of
security problems creates an unbalanced approach of addressing security issues
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within an organization; therefore, security failures must be addressed by both
technical and non-technical means.
As organizations redesign and implement business processes for their
Information Systems (IS), the systems development process provides
organizations a method to analyze, design, test, and implement business processes
to address usability-related information systems security failures (Siponen, 2001).
According to Yee (2004), there is a conflict in the systems development process
aligning security and usability, since “usability improvements yield compromised
software, and adding security measures have made software tedious to use or hard
to understand” (p.48). This is particularly true and problematic in healthcare
organizations, which are characterized by non-traditional work environments that
use heterogeneous HIS, where the work flows is often mobile, high-paced,
chaotic, and highly collaborative (Bardram, 2005). Bardram (2005) has argued
usability-related security failures associated with login mechanisms have not
recognized the nature of medical work; therefore, the consequence has led to
login procedures being circumvented and the security of the organization being
jeopardized.
Essentially, an application or system failure and usability security failures
share a symbiotic relationship. In fact, usability security failure is defined as not
having reliable software that allows expected users to be made aware of the
security tasks they need to perform (Sheng et al., 2006; Whitten & Tygar, 1999).
A security task in the healthcare context is a business process that provides
information to the user through an interface during the usability failure on the
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next step a user should take in the process after the failure occurs. In essence, it is
a security control that protects the organization’s information assets.
In a healthcare organization, usability-related information systems security
failures can be fatal. The consequences of usability-related information systems
security failures were highlighted in 1999 Institute of Medicine reports stating
that 44,000 to 98,000 Americans die each year from preventable medical errors,
and that medical errors cost the United States $37.6 billion each year. The errors
were a byproduct of misaligned business processes that were created by
information-handling failures in effectively diagnosing and treating patients. The
information-handling failure arose from systems and communications failures that
caused misinterpretation of information by patients and physicians (Dennison,
2005).
The primary focus of usability security has been on user authentication and
email encryption (Payne & Edward, 2008). Thus, there has been very little
identifiable research in the domain of usability security that has addressed the
impact usability failures have on the accomplishment of healthcare tasks and
usability-related information systems security failures. The aim of this research is
to identify and enhance the understanding of usability-related security failures and
how the failures impact IS security performance in a healthcare organization.
1.2 Problem Statement
The research problem for this study is to understand the nature and types of
usability-related security failures and how they can be reduced in a HIS. Ka-Ping
(2002) and Whitten and Tygar (1999) have stated that usability security research
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focuses on providing better user interfaces in the area of human computer
interaction. However, usability security is much more than user interfaces; it is the
information from the interaction conveyed by the user interface, the domain in
which the user belongs, and the interpretation of the actions of the user that must
be considered when evaluating the ramifications of usability-related security
failures. Developing a method to identify and understand the nature of usabilityrelated security failures within a HIS allows an organization’s staff to effectively
incorporate security controls. These security controls can help address the
information systems security risk users’ encounter interacting with applications
and systems of an HIS.
Understanding usability-related information systems security failures
encountered by users of HIS will allow for researchers and practitioners to better
understand and address information systems security risks as these risks have the
potential to negatively affect patient care information in the healthcare setting.
Researchers have argued that there is a need to address usability security controls
in the software development process (Schecter, Dhamija, Ozment, & Fischer,
2007) along with a need to add security controls throughout the software
development process (Baskerville, 1988). However, there has been little evidence
that organizations have adopted and succeeded at this approach. This researcher
argues that, to reduce usability security failures, organizations must align security
technology with tasks performed by healthcare workers and ensure such
alignment does not hamper security performance in a healthcare organization.
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1.3 Research Question
The first research question of the proposed study is what are the nature and types of
usability-related information systems security failures in a HIS? HIS are comprised of
heterogeneous and disparate data and systems used to deliver healthcare to patients.
According to Marcus (2002), the interaction a user has with a computer creates inputs
and outputs at the local and global levels. Local-level feedback consists of the
information returned from peripheral devices from monitors or printers, while the global
level feedback references contextual issues and task activities from applications and
systems from within or outside of an organization. It is the very nature of interactions
HIS users have along with the information returned from the feedback of the interactions
at the local and global levels that will determine the source and type of usability-related
information systems security failure existing within an organization. The source and type
of usability-related information systems security failure determines the behavior of the
application, system and user. In the literature review section, Jacobson, Booch, and
Rumbaugh (1999) identified nine types of usability failures that can essentially create a
reaction from IS users. Capturing the sources and types of usability failures along with
understanding the interactions between the user, task, and application or system wherein
the security failure occurs allows the organization to determine the type of interventions
that are required.
The second research question is how does usability-related information
systems security failures impact task accomplishment in a healthcare setting?
The antecedent of a usability-related information systems security failure is a
usability failure occurring when a user encounters a failed interaction from the
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application or system in use. Researchers of usability failures have analyzed
improving the user experience by improving a user interface (e.g., Flechais et al.,
2007) in an effort to reduce the behavior of system users in rejecting, rebelling
against or misusing the system. This approach has proven to be problematic as
users may experience an improvement on the interface, but security is also
compromised in the design process. The outlying problem in usability security
design is it is resolved at the technical level (Payne & Edward, 2008), which
creates potential information risk in an organization’s security program by not
using a balanced approach. Usability research has also shown that a usability
failure may cause users of an HIS to circumvent the system to complete a task
(Johnson & Willey, 2011), create their own workarounds (Halbesleben,
Wakefield, & Wakefield, 2008), or reject the system entirely. There has been
very little research that has taken the perspective of evaluating the congruence of
usability-related information systems security failures in relation to how the
technology fits the task of the user, and how that fit impacts the performance of
the user. Diagnosing task-technology-fit in reference to a usability failure creates
opportunities to detect where information security failures occur.
1.4 Key Definitions
For this research study, four terms are important to shape the context of this
research through the use of definitions. In order to assign a definition to
information, one must follow the path information travels in order to be used by
the receiver. When information is described or defined in research, it is often
done using the Data-Information-Knowledge (DIK) hierarchy. DIK is grounded
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in IT to distinguish the differences and the roles DIK plays within an
organization. Data are often viewed as being raw and simply exist without any
significance. Tejay, Dhillon, and Chin (2005) assert that data are a fundamental
information asset, while Dhillon and Backhouse (2001) acknowledge the primary
focus of IS security is on data. When context is added to data, they are
transformed into information, and that information then becomes knowledge that
can be used by the receiver. The path in which data travel and transform allows
this study to take on the definition of information per Avison and Fitzgerald
(1995) as the meaning that comes from selecting, summarizing and presenting
data in such a way that becomes useful to the recipient.
The term information systems has often been defined by researchers as the
way in which computer systems provide information in support of organizational
structure, business processes, and people. The information system definition is
often interpreted by researchers using three levels. Iivari and Hirchheim (1996)
described their three levels as the organization level, which is the host
organization, the language level, encompassing the formalized rules of
communicating transmitted and received information by users in the organization,
and the technical level, consisting of the computer systems used in the
organization. The three levels imply that information must be managed beyond
technical means to account for social and organizational roles information has
within an organization. For the purpose of this research, an information system is
considered an aggregate of information-handling activities at the technical, formal
and informal levels of an organization (Liebenau & Backhouse, 1990). The
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technical, formal, and informal levels of an information system can be visualized
using the components of a hard-boiled egg as the point of reference. The
technical system is the yolk consisting of the IT used in an organization, the
formal system is the egg white, encompassing the rules, and policies created
within an organization, and the informal system is the shell, which is viewed as
the organizational culture. The three components combine to form the automation
and coordination of information-handling activities along with providing guidance
to the information users.
In respect to information systems security, it has been viewed as providing
technical means to secure the infrastructure of an organization. Information
systems consist of information-handling activities at the technical, formal and
informal levels respectively; therefore, security controls must be addressed and
balanced at all three levels to mitigate risk in an organization. In this research
study, information systems security is defined as a well-informed sense of
assurance that information risks and controls are in balance (Anderson, 2003).
Information is an asset in an organization that has varying levels of value. The
value of the information determines the level of controls along with the level of
resources that should be committed to protect the information. The amount of
resources committed to protect information should not outweigh the value of the
information; therefore, a balance and “sense of assurance” is obtained when
protecting information assets.
There are a host of usability definitions held by researchers in the domain of
human computer interaction that centers on adding quality and value to the user’s
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experience. Usability is often defined based on how it is viewed along with how
it should be measured (Bevan, Karakowski, & Maissel, 1991). The productoriented view measures ergonomic attributes, the user-oriented view measures the
mental effort and attitude of the user, and the user-performance view examines
how the user interacts with the product, seeking to measure ease-of-use and
acceptability of the product (Bevan et al., 1991). This research will adopt the
definition proposed by ISO 9241-11 (1998) as the extent to which a product can
be used by specified users to achieve specified goals with effectiveness, efficiency
and satisfaction in a specified context of use. This definition encompasses the
entire user experience interacting with an IS.
1.5 Summary
Usability failures can become an organizational security issue when providing
HIS users a means to access information in a timely and secure manner. In the
areas of usability security, researchers have primarily evaluated methods and
techniques in designing secure user interfaces while improving the human
interaction with a computer system (Flechais, Mascolo, & Sasse, 2007).
However, usability security encompasses a great deal more, particularly when
researchers have linked usability failures to user resistance, sabotage of computer
equipment, tampering with data or creating their own workarounds. This can be
highly problematic within a healthcare organization; thus, the premise of this
research study is to understand the nature and types of usability-related security
failures and how they can be reduced in a HIS.
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Chapter 2
Literature Review

2.1 Introduction
The aim of this chapter is to provide an understanding of the extant literature in the
area of usability, while highlighting the gaps in the usability domain that provide
opportunities to use IS security practices to improve the organizational security program.
The review of usability and IS security literature was conducted following the methods
of Ellis and Levy (2006). Papers were selected and examined from key researchers in
the Human Computer Interaction (HCI) and IS security fields emphasizing the search
criteria under the research domains of usability and IS security development. The
underlined argument of this literature review is usability failures lead to IS security
failures if not addressed, but can be reduced by aligning healthcare tasks with the
technology within an HIS. This can be accomplished by applying the proper IS security
controls.
2.2 IS Security
In this research study, the IS security context follows the views of Dhillon and
Backhouse (2000), Liebenau and Backhouse (1990), and Klein and Hirschheim (1987)
which consider an organization is constituted of informal, formal, and technical parts.
The technical, formal, and informal parts must be addressed at each level in the form of
information systems security controls that are balanced in an organization. To ensure
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information security controls are applied accurately, the organization’s risk management
program must assess IT resources and information assets to identify threats and
vulnerabilities and apply the appropriate measures to mitigate the risk.
2.2.1 Technical Security
The intent of technical security is to secure computer resources such as hardware,
software, and the data that reside in a computer system (Dhillon, 2007). Dhillon stated
that hardware, software, and data are primarily vulnerable to six threats: (a) data
modification, (b) destructions, (c) disclosure, (d) interception, (e) interruption, and (f)
fabrication. Data modification occurs when data held in the computer system are
accessed and changed without permission. Destruction occurs when hardware, software,
or data are destroyed because of malicious intent. Disclosure happens when data are
made available or access to software is made available without consent. Interception
occurs when an unauthorized person or software application gains access to data or
computer resources, and interruption is when a computer system becomes unavailable for
use. The final threat, fabrication, happens when unauthentic transactions or records are
inserted or added to an organization’s database system. At the technical level, data are
one of the resources that organizations seek to protect by applying technical controls.
One stream of research has dealt with controls for securing data itself, often
using different types of encryption (Blythe, 2008). A second research stream has
focused on the use of digital signatures to facilitate trusted transactions between
parties (Blythe, 2008; Rivest, 1978; Tompkins & Handley, 2003). Software
controls seek to secure infrastructures from the inside by strengthening the
applications that are present on IS (August & Tunca, 2006; Shimeall &

15
McDermott, 1999). Finally, many studies have focused on numerous hardware
solutions, including intrusion detection and firewalls (Denning, 1987; Frincke,
2000; Vigna & Kemmerer, 1999).
2.2.2 Data Security Requirements
Data security requirements are linked to the classic CIA (Confidentiality, Integrity,
and Availability) triad of information protection (Dunkerley, & Tejay, 2009).
Confidentiality is the prevention of unauthorized disclosure of information, integrity is
the guarantee that the message sent is the same as the message received, and availability
is the guarantee that information will be available to the user in a timely and
uninterrupted manner. With the advent of networked organizations and the usage of the
Internet in reference to Electronic Commerce, authentication and non-repudiation have
been discussed as important security requirements based on the context of application and
system use. Authentication guarantees the message is from the source it claims to be
from, and non-repudiation prevents an individual or entity from denying having
performed a particular action related to data (Siponen & Oinas-Kukkonen, 2007);
however, for this research study, the CIA triad will be the area of focus in relation to
technical security controls.
Technical security controls in relation to the CIA triad focus on protecting the
resources of systems through the means of authentication and access control (Siponen &
Oinas-Kukkonen, 2007). Authentication methods include passwords (Denning, 1992)
and token-based authentication using special purpose devices such as smart cards
(Hendry, 1997). Authenticating with a password is primarily done through passwords
mechanisms such as (a) traditional passwords, (b) system-generated passwords, (c)
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passphrases, (d) cognitive passwords and (e) associative passwords (Zviran & Haga,
1993). The goal of access control is to guarantee that the requirements of integrity,
availability, and confidentiality of security objects are not compromised. Security objects
(resources) are files, directories, tuples, or relations (Sandhu, 1993). Access control
includes the prevention of all unwanted flows of information between objects and
subjects, including any flows of information that could be used to attain information,
which needs to be secure (Siponen & Oinas-Kukkonen, 2007) Access control techniques
includes access matrix (Mclean, 1990), mandatory, discretionary, and role-based access
control policies (Boswell, 1995; Sandhu & Samarati, 1996). Access control matrixes are
a means of establishing the type of access control policies that will be applied to an
organization, while mandatory, discretionary, and role-based access control policies are
applied based on the type of access control matrix that will best benefit the users and
resources that are being protected in an organization.
2.2.3 Risk Management
Organizations apply risk management techniques using both quantitative and
qualitative methods. According to Saleh and Alfantookh (2011), there are over 200 risk
management methods used in industry primarily because organizations typically seek to
adopt a method that is in alignment with their specific information security management
program. Labuschagne and Eloff (1998) argued that most available risk management
methods derive from a scientific core, thus focusing on technology that proposes
technical solutions, which negates addressing human, organizational strategic or
environmental factors. Most quantitative risk methods are based on using loss exposure
as a function of the vulnerability of an asset to a threat multiplied by the probability of a
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threat becoming a reality (Rainer et al., 1991). These methods are called expected
valuate analyses, which include annualized loss expectancy (ALE) (Post & Diltz, 1986),
the Livermore Risk Analysis Methodology (LRAM), (Guarro, 1987) and Stochastic
Dominance (Post & Diltz, 1986). Qualitative methodologies attempt to express risk in
descriptive variables rather than precise dollar amounts (Ranier et al., 1991). Ranier et al.
(1991) stated that qualitative risk methods are based on the assumptions that certain
threats or loss of data cannot be appropriately expressed in dollars or discrete events, and
that precise information may be unobtainable. Some of the qualitative methods are
Scenario Analysis (Hammond, 1988; Newton & Snyder, 1987), Operational Critical
Threat Asset and Vulnerability Evaluation OCTAVE (Woody, 2006), and CCTA risk
analysis and management method CRAMM (Sun, Srivastava, & Mock, 2006).
Risk analysis and risk management do not lack critics highlighting their shortcoming
such as lacking a scientific approach (Baskerville, 1991), lack of clarity (Alter & Sherer,
2004), and, according to Spears (2006), being based largely on guesswork. The
criticisms of “lacking of a scientific approach,” to “lack of clarity,” and “guesswork” in
the risk management process stems from how an organization determines the value of
intangible assets such as information (Gerber & von Solms, 2005) along with
determining the vulnerability of an asset along with other factors. Gerber and von Solms
(2005) argued that it is difficult if not impossible to estimate the value of information,
and Suh and Han (2003) stated that organizations typically consider replacement cost, but
the financial loss caused by the disruption of operation is highly subjective. Lastly, the
impact of a breach and the loss of customer confidence are extremely difficult to estimate
(Bennett & Kailay, 1992).
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According to Voster and Labuschagne (2005), the common goal of risk management
methods are to prioritize and estimate the risk value and to suggest the most suitable
mitigation plan to eliminate or minimize risk to an acceptable level, but other scholars
(Huang, Ding, & Hu, 2008; Niekerk & Labuschagne, 2006; Zuccatto, 2004) have called
for a more holistic approach to risk management that minimizes the shortcoming of risk
management methods. A holistic approach to risk management focuses equally on
minimizing risk in the areas of technology, information, people, and processes (Spears,
2006). One of the benefits of using a holistic approach to information security
management is that it involves business users to the extent necessary to identify a
comprehensive set of risk while also promoting security awareness throughout the
organization (Lategan & Solms, 2006). Several researchers have created information
security risk management frameworks (Huang et al., 2008; Saleh & Alfaantookh, 2011;
Zuccato, 2007) to holistically address information security risk in organizations with a
focus on the technology, the people, the business processes, and the environment.
2.2.4 User Security
User security delves into the human experience a computer user has with computer
resources such as an information system within an organization. Human-related
information security research covers the social aspects of security an organization is
faced with as it relates to organizational members, such as usability, security culture,
security awareness, training, along with the behavior of the user and other human-related
issues. Current human-related information security research has been categorized into
four main directions by Stanton, Stam, Mastrangelo, and Jolton (2005): (a) user
interfaces of security-related systems; (b) information security management concerns for
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risk, business processes and finance; (c) organizational issues related to information
security behavior; and (d) counterproductive computer usage. This research study
touches on all four categories in that a usability failure from an interaction with an
interface creates information risk based on the behavior the user will have after the
usability failure. The behavior of the user can result in counterproductive computer
usage. To address “human-related” information security issues is to understand the
users’ point of view as it relates to information systems security. Wier, Douglas,
Richardson, and Jack (2010) have observed that security is not the main goal of a user’s
interaction with a computer system. Post and Kagan (2006) stated that employees in an
organization are more likely to bypass security measures in order to complete a task. To
further expand on the chasm between users of an information system and information
security, Albrechtsen and Hovden (2009) argued that there is a digital divide between
information security managers and users that has created a misalignment of the security
practices levied by the organization in relation to the dynamics of the user’s workday.
A useful tool in aligning computer users in an organization with the security
guidelines and rules an organization implements in relation to the use of computer
resources is through the use of security policies (Ifinedo, 2012; Knapp & Marshall,
2006s). Understanding the impact a computer user’s behavior can have on information
security has allowed researchers to develop concepts, theories, and research relevant to
human behavior in organizations and how the behavior affects information security
(Stanton et al., 2005). Two streams of information security research that address user
behavior is counterproductive computer usage (Stanton, 2002; Weatherbee, 2010) and
insider threat (Post & Kagan, 2006; Warkentin & Wilson, 2009). Counterproductive
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computer usage consists of a computer user in an organization that exposes the
information assets to risk or liability or a loss of productivity time by engaging in
activities that are counter to established computer resource usage policies (Mastrangelo,
Everton, & Jolton, 2006). Insider threat refers to intentionally disruptive, unethical, or
illegal behavior enacted by individuals who possess substantial internal access to the
organization’s information assets (Stanton et al., 2005).
Counterproductive computer usage and insider threats research both focus on users of
information systems that primarily subvert organization security policies for their own
benefit. The security controls implemented for counterproductive computer usage and
insider threats do not account for the misalignment of a user task and the technology
implemented in an organization. The misalignment of a user task and the technology
creates a breakdown in security controls that skews the behavior of the user, particularly
in a healthcare organization where the task has an impact on the outcome of human life.
Evaluating misaligned task, technology, and the behavior of the user of an IS will provide
valuable insight into addressing user security.
2.3 Usability
Usability falls under the research domain of HCI. HCI in IS are “concerned
with the ways humans interact with information, technologies, and tasks,
especially in business, managerial, organizational, and cultural contexts’’ (Zhang,
Benbasat, Carey, Davis, Galletta, & Strong, 2002, p. 334). Usability is derived
from HCI principles, wherein designers of software application interfaces
understand that systems for users should be easy to learn, useful, contain
functions people really need in their work, and be easy and pleasant to use
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(Bevan, 2005). The manner in which this is done is through adding the
appropriate usability design techniques and usability evaluation methods that
evaluate the task, the context, and behavior of the user as the user interacts with a
computer application or system.
User interface literature primarily focuses on developing better interfaces
(Shneiderman, Jacobs, Cohen, & Plaisant, 2009), securing the interface (Bourimi et al.,
2012; Brostoff, 2004), analyzing and critiquing software tools used for interface
development (Cranor & Garfinkel, 2005), and assessing usability evaluation methods
(Cockton, 2008; Hartson, Andre, & Williges, 2001). User interfaces are the portal to a
user’s experience with a computer system. The extant literature discusses user interfaces
in the context of interactive products that are used primarily to help the user perform a
task via the product’s user interface. According to Juristo, Moreno, and Sanchez-Segura
(2007), the user interface can be characterized narrowly as an interface comprising the
input and output devices and the software that services them, while also using broader
terms characterizing a user interface that includes everything that shapes users’
experiences with computers, including documentation, training, and human support.
Usability improves the design of user interface by evaluating the organization,
presentation, and interactivity of the interface (Shneiderman et al., 2009). Shneiderman
(1987) provided seminal research in the area of interactive user interface design,
discussing strategies for designing high-quality interactive systems by applying the
syntactic and semantic model of user knowledge. The syntactic/semantic model
suggests that users have both syntactic knowledge about device details and semantic
knowledge about concepts, which are separated into task concepts and computer
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concepts. Syntactic knowledge is gained through repetitive actions and familiarity with
a specific task or computer systems while semantic knowledge is gained through
meaningful learning. Despite the blue print user-interface design strategies provided by
Shneiderman, researchers continue to look for methods to design interfaces to reduce
errors a user can encounter.
A user’s interaction with an application or system when a usability failure occurs is
central to determining whether security controls are aligned with an organization’s
business process. Blandford, Thimblebly, and Bryan-Kinns (2003) suggest users
encounter interaction traps as a consequence of misunderstanding their ability to
complete a task due to a system failure. The interaction trap occurs when the user
encounters detours, barriers, or objectives that are unable to be achieved. According to
Marcus (2002), the results created interacting with a computer include the input and
output techniques, status displays, and feedback at the local and global levels. At the
local level, feedback users receive are related to the behavior of the physical aspects of a
computer system, such as a visual display of a computer screen or peripheral devices like
the response of a printer when initiated by the user. At the global level, context issues
and task activities at a larger scale are presented to users.
Context is gathered in an automated fashion using a combination of sensing and
complex rules to allow applications to react to relevant changes in an organizational
environment (Dey & Newberg, 2009). Context of use and the interaction of a user serve
as a barometer to measure the impact a failed task from a usability failure has on the
impact of performance. Crowley et al. (2002) described “context of use” for an
interactive system as consisting of three key attributes: (a) users of the system who are
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intended to use (and/or who effectively use) the system; (b) hardware and software
platform(s), that is, the computational and interaction device(s) that can be used for
interacting with the system; and (c) the physical environment where the interaction can
take place. The context of use attributes can be applied to hospital and clinical settings
in the mere business practices used. A user in the healthcare environment can vary
based on the nature of the task, from the patient to the physician, which can determine
the system used and the environment in which the task will be accomplished. Hospital
and clinical settings are among the many organizations that are often used for contextaware applications in their environment to take action without explicit user input (Dey &
Newberg, 2009). Research in the area of context-aware applications suggest that users
become frustrated when they do not understand why a system performs an action, not
allowing the user the ability to fix the problem (Barkhuus & Dey, 2003).
2.3.1 Usability Failure
Software usability deficiencies are determined by the problems users have in
carrying out a standard set of actions using software (Rubin, Chisnell, & Spool, 2008).
In this research study, user problems from software usability deficiencies are
synonymous with usability failures. According to Winograd and Flores (1986), usability
failures often result in interaction breakdowns. Winograd and Flores and Blandford et
al. (2003) have stated that breakdowns occur when a user faces enough difficulty
accomplishing a task so that the user is able to identify that the user interface is the
source of the problem. Jacobson et al. (1999) defined usability failure as being indicated
by any of nine criteria: (a) the user articulates a goal and cannot succeed in attaining it,
(b) the user explicitly gives up, (c) the user articulates a goal and has to try a different
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method to find a solution, (d) the user produces a result different from the task given, (e)
the user expresses surprise, (f) the user expresses some negative affect or says something
is a problem, (g) the user makes a design suggestion, (h) the system crashes, (i) the
evaluator generalizes a group of previously detected problems into a new problem.
Jacobson et al. (1999) provided a usability failure definition as a foundation of where
to begin in applying methods to address and reduce usability failures. Based on this
definition, it can be concluded that a usability failure, particularly when a system fails, is
essentially the same as an information systems security failure. Therefore, usability
failures, and usability-related information security failures should be addressed using the
same strategies organizations use to improve their overall security program.
2.3.2 Usability Development and Design
Usability development and design is the primary area of focus in the HCI and
usability domain. In the domain of usability development, usability design principles are
the basis for designing usable software applications. According to Juristo et al. (2007),
with some notable exceptions, software development is primarily concerned with the
inner workings of the system, while usability development focuses on the user. In the
software development process, the user’s role is a manner in which the development
team can elicit requirements, while in the context of usability development, also termed
user-centered development, the users are the reason for designing the system (Gould &
Lewis, 1985; Peslak, 2005).
The difference in usability development design perspectives highlights the challenge
in the software development process; however, the development process presents a
means to understand how the varying development perspectives create an opportunity to
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address the issues that stem from the development staff’s disconnect with the users. For
example, a usability error such as the failure for a user to access a system due to an
authentication breakdown between two systems may not be viewed as a failure in the
application that was developed. The failure may be viewed as a “memorability” or
“learnability” problem by the user; however, the inability to access an application is also
an IS security failure, and should be addressed accordingly. The ability to have
usability-related security failures come to the fore reported by users that suffer such
failures and address the security failures through adequate security controls adds security
value to both the usability and information system security communities.
Usability evaluation methods (UEM) are used to measure and identify potential issues
affecting usability attributes of a system or devices with respect to particular users
performing a particular task in a particular context (Hilbert & Redmiles, 2000). The
usability attributes are learnability, efficiency, memorability, errors, and satisfaction
(Nielsen, 1993). Applying usability attributes can vary depending on the background
knowledge and experience of users, the task for which the system is used, and the context
in which it is used (Hilbert & Redmiles, 2000). Usability researchers have proposed
several classifications of UEMs. Fernandez, Insfran, and Abrahao (2011) observed that
UEMs are principally are classified into two different types: empirical methods and
inspections methods. According to Fernandez et al., empirical methods are based on
capturing and analyzing usage data from end users, and inspection methods are
performed by expert evaluators or designers.
The most common types of UEMs are Heuristic Evaluations (Nielsen & Molich,
1990), cognitive walkthroughs (Wharton et al., 1992), goals operator methods and
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selection (Card et al. 1983), and cogtools (John et al., 2004). According to Reisterer and
Oppermann (1993), a complete evaluation of usability must consider the user, the task,
the computer, and the organization. UEMs are evaluated during the testing or
implementation stages of the development process (Akers, Jeffries, Simpson, &
Winograd, 2012), which leaves unanswered questions in the usability domain in relation
to managing usability-related information security failures once software is released into
the organization.
2.4 Healthcare Information System
There has been a great deal of literature chronicling the evolution of healthcare
organizations and their ability to adopt IT. The adoption of IT within the healthcare
organization has brought about a cornucopia of terms and definitions to describe the
software and hardware technology used within the organization. Healthcare literature is
bombarded with such terms as hospital information systems, healthcare information
systems, health information systems, medical information systems, clinical information
systems, patient care information systems, and nursing information systems to describe
both the applications and systems that process data and produce information for the user
to provide point of care to patients. Users who provide point-of-care to patients within
the healthcare context are physicians, clinicians, and healthcare workers. Physicians and
clinicians provide direct observation and care to patients, while healthcare workers assist
in the process by carrying out orders issued by physicians and clinicians.
In addition to identifying the types of systems that process data and produce
information along with the types of users in the healthcare environment, there are also
applications (subsystems) that require identification. Computerized Order Entry Records
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(CPOE), Electronic Health Records (EHR), Electronic Medical Record (EMR) and
Computer-Based Patient Records (CBPR) are essentially subsystems or byproducts of the
information system. Decisions regarding Healthcare IT (HIT) implementations are often
made at the department level, with each department developing subsystems based on its
needs, beliefs, practices, and expertise (Harkee, Alessi, & Collan, 2003; Kim &
Unmanath, 1999). The fact that these subsystems contain multi-platform, multi-vendor
application wrappers built around multivariate data sources contributes to the complexity
of HIS (Orgun & Vu, 2006). The results of decisions to acquire and implement HIT are
autonomous and heterogeneous systems (Devaraj & Kohli, 2000; Toussaint, Bakker, &
Groeneweegen, 1992) that access and retrieve data from disparate sources, which is the
healthcare environment. There is a rich stream of literature in the healthcare environment
reporting problems caused by autonomous and heterogeneous systems such as user
resistance, HIT implementation and project failures primarily due to interoperability and
usability failures (Bhattacherjee & Hikmet; 2007; Johnson & Willey, 2011; Vega,
Schieferdecker, & Din, 2010).
With the numerous terms used to describe systems in the healthcare environment
along with the many subsystems used, the healthcare environment terms used in this
research study will be operationalized. The subsystems described previously are the
interfaces where information handling activities (interactions) take place, and the
definition of an HIS is aligned with Backhouse and Liebenau (1990) as an aggregate of
information-handling activities at the technical, formal and informal levels of an
organization. These information-handling activities comprise subsystems composed of
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autonomous, heterogeneous and disparate software applications and hardware systems
that interoperate to provide information to the users of the system.
2.5. Summary
Healthcare organizations are composed of heterogeneous and disparate information
systems intertwined with complex business processes that create a great deal of
challenges for the users of the system. The manner in which IT systems and products are
implemented along with the overlapping and intricate tasks the users have pose problems
in the area of usability. Usability research primarily focuses on the user interface;
therefore, designing a better interface often leaves security in question. When usability
failures arise from the misalignment between healthcare task and the technology used in
healthcare organizations, the security of information is jeopardized. Information is
jeopardized when the CIA of computer resources are rendered vulnerable from usability
failures. Usability failures are a technical security issue; therefore, technical security
controls must be evaluated and applied accordingly. Applying the appropriate IS security
controls will reduce usability security failures while also improving the practices used to
design, develop and implement user interfaces.
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Chapter 3
Research Methodology
3.1 Introduction
In this chapter, the theoretical framework, research model, and research
method will be discussed. This chapter begins by discussing the theoretical
framework of Goodhue (1988; 1995) and Goodhue and Thompson (1995) to
study the research problem. The development of the research model is then
discussed. Finally, the research method is discussed.
3.2 Theoretical Framework
The theoretical framework in this research study is an extension of the work of
Goodhue (1988; 1995) and Goodhue and Thompson (1995) regarding TTF theory and the
Technology-to-Performance Chain (TPC) fit focus model. The TTF theory holds that, for
IT to have a positive impact on individual performance, the technology must be utilized
and it must be a good fit with the task it supports. The TPC model “draws on insights
from two complimentary streams of research (user attitudes as predictors of utilization
and task-technology fit as a predictor of performance)” (Goodhue & Thompson, p. 213).
The TPC model tests user evaluation and performance impacts, which are consistent with
the research model proposed by DeLone and McLean (1992) in that utilization and user
attitudes lead to individual performance impacts. However, the TPC model goes beyond
the IS Success model of Delone and McLean where the TPC model explains how
technology leads to performance impacts, along with explicitly detailing the manner in

30
which the TTF constructs provides the theoretical basis for evaluating the issues related
to the impact of IT on performance.
Goodhue and Thompson’s (1995) TTF model is measured using eight factors
that are distributed among the TTF constructs of task, technology, and individual
characteristics respectively. The dimensions of TTF along with the eight factors
are listed in Appendix A. The factors will be discussed at length later in this
section. Goodhue and Thompson suggest decomposing the TTF theoretical
model into more detailed components to facilitate the usage of TTF as a
diagnostic tool to measure how well the technology of an organization fits a task,
and how that task ultimately impacts performance. TTF with a “fit focus”
provides that opportunity as it proposes that IS has a positive impact on
performance only when there is a corresponding “fit” between their functionality
and the task requirements of users. Figure 1 contains the TTF “fit focus” model
preceded by an explanation of the constructs.

Figure 1. TTF “Fit Focus” model (Goodhue & Thompson, 1995)
Technology characteristics are tools used by individuals in carrying out their
tasks. In an IS research context, the tools consist of hardware, software, data, and
user support services (training and help lines, etc.) provided to assist users in their
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task. Task characteristics are actions carried out by individuals turning inputs into
outputs. Task characteristics of interest include those that might move a user to
rely heavily on certain aspects of the information technology. The example
Goodhue and Thompson (1995) use is relying on the organization’s IS to process
queries against a database. TTF, the degree to which a technology assists
individuals in performing their portfolio of tasks, is the correspondence between
task requirements, individual abilities, and the functionality of the technology.
Antecedents of TTF are the interactions between task, technology, and
individual. For example, certain tasks require specific kinds of technological
functionality from various organizational units, which encompasses integrated
databases being accessible to all users in the organization. As the gap between
task requirements and the functionality of the technology widens, TTF is reduced.
Performance impact in this context is related to an accomplishment of a portfolio
of tasks by an individual. Higher performance is characterized by improved
efficiency, improved effectiveness, and/or higher quality. High TTF increases the
likelihood of utilization, but also increases the performance impact of the system.
The task-technology fit theory allows organizational members to assess the
capability of their IT systems, along with how those systems impact individual
performance, while also assessing the behavior and attitudes of the individual user
while interacting with an IS. The TTF model aligns very well with the healthcare
environment, particularly with the constant implementation of IT products that are
often driven at the department level to improve point of care for patients.
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3.3. Task-technology Fit in IS Context
TTF theory has evolved from Goodhue (1988; 1995) to Goodhue and
Thompson (1995). The evolution of TTF has benefited the IS community with
key research studies extending the TTF theory as suggested by Goodhue (1988;
1995) and by Goodhue and Thompson (1995). For example, Zigurs and Buckland
(1998) examined the TTF construct focusing on Group Support Systems (GSS)
environment. Zigurs and Buckland evaluated the fit between complex tasks and
how those tasks impacted group performance. The GSS literature indicates a
direct correlation between the importance of the task between fit and effective
GSS use. However, GSS literature has not been able to use a single method to
evaluate the various GSS task characteristics i.e., simple task, single solution task,
or idea-generation task. Zigurs and Buckland were able to address the issues of
evaluating various task characteristics using TTF by analyzing the task using
complexity dimensions instead of focusing on the components of a task.
Complexity dimensions consist of four constructs that take into account the task
attributes used in the GSS environment.
A second extension of TTF used in the IS domain is the TPC model, which follows
the research stream of utilization and fit (Goodhue & Thompson, 1995). Goodhue (1995)
and Goodhue and Thompson (1995) have stated that, when utilization can be assumed,
the utilization construct of TTF is not required. This research study assumes the
utilization of an HIS is mandatory; therefore, this research aligns with the fit focus model
of TTF theory. Further, there has been a small number of researchers who have
conducted IS research utilizing TTF theory primarily focusing on the fit conceptual
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model. The researchers have argued that performance impacts will result from TTF when
a technology provides features that fit the requirement of a task. Benbasat et al. (1986)
and Dickson et al. (1986) used the “fit focus” model to examine the impact of graphs
versus tables on individual decision-making performance. The researchers used a series
of laboratory experiments that reported how two types of technology characteristics
directly influenced user performance based on the fit with the task.
3.4. Research Model
In order to further develop both the research model and the hypotheses to be
tested, we must first operationalize the TTF constructs. The operationalized
research model is presented in Figure 2 extending the TTF theory in a healthcare
setting. The original task characteristics construct of TTF will be termed
healthcare task characteristics, while the technology characteristic construct will
be termed security technology characteristics. The TTF construct will remain
unchanged, while the performance impact construct is concerned with HIS
security performance impacts. These constructs are further discussed in the
following paragraphs.

Figure 2. Research model with hypotheses testing
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Healthcare task characteristics. The goal is to assess whether or not the
healthcare worker is supported by the HIS to complete the task. The healthcare
task will be measured by the identification of the type of task the user is engaged
in, and the job role of the user with which the task is associated. The task will be
categorized as routine or non-routine, along with the number and types of
applications and systems that are required for task accomplishment.
Goodhue (1995) used the attributes of non-routineness and interdependence to
measure task characteristics. Non-routineness is the difficulty level required to
complete a task. Goodhue suggested that, since users who engage in routine and
repetitive tasks are familiar with the task, users have the ability to work around
the IS to complete their task with the minimum amount of interruption or
frustration where non-routine task are characterized by the dependence of
multiple applications, systems, and business processes used to complete the task.
The second attribute interdependence is identified and measured by a user being
engaged in a task that must integrate with multiple systems to access and retrieve
data to allow the task to be completed. Problems often occur in this area when
data are incompatible or unable to be accessed or delivered in the form expected.
Security technology characteristics. The goal is to assess the level of technical
security controls that are in place when healthcare workers attempt to complete their
assigned task. The security technology will be measured by identifying the type of
resources, which includes hardware, software, and data that was used and rendered
vulnerable when a usability failure occurred. Usability failures associated with hardware,
software, and data threaten the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of these
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resources are is a fundamental security requirement that must be protected. Capturing
and identifying the resources that were rendered vulnerable that are associated with the
task the healthcare worker is engaged in, allowing this research study to further
understand the nature of usability failures from the technical security perspective. This
allows a linkage to form between the task and technology at the point of the technology
failure, but it also provide a means to better understand what the healthcare worker was
exposed to during the interaction with the technology. This will provide and shape the
context of how a healthcare worker’s security performance is impacted when a usability
failure occurs.
Task Technology Fit. The TTF factors are linked to the task and technology
characteristics respectively. TTF is measured by eight factors: (a) data quality
(DQ), (b) locatability of data, (c) authorization to access data, (d) data
compatibility (between systems), (e) training and ease of use, (f) production
timeliness (IS meeting scheduled operations), (g) systems reliability, and (h) IS
relationships with users. The first five factors of TTF have links from the
healthcare task construct to TTF, while the last three have links with security
technology characteristic regarding TTF. The combined eight TTF factors form
the three hypotheses that will be tested by dissecting the research model into two
components. Component A will focus on testing hypotheses one and two that link
both the task characteristic and security technology characteristics construct to
TTF, while component B will test how TTF links to HIS security performance
impacts. The following is a breakdown of the hypotheses:
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3.4.1 Hypotheses Component A
Hypothesis 1: Healthcare Task Characteristics Linkage to TTF. The factors
that will be measured are directly linked with TTF are DQ, locatability of the
data, authorization to access the data, data compatibility between the systems, and
training and ease of use. DQ seeks to identify the currency of the data, so that the
right data are maintained with the right level of detail. Locatability of the data is
centered on locating the data along with the ability to easily find out the meaning
of the data. Authorization is users having access to the data to complete a task.
Compatibility is having access to data that are accessed and used from
heterogeneous and disparate IS. Ease of use/training is providing hardware or
software that is easy to use, while providing the appropriate level of training and
IT support where necessary. A solid relationship among healthcare task
characteristic factors signals the link between the two constructs, creating an
efficient healthcare task; therefore, the following hypothesis will be tested:
H1: Healthcare task characteristics will be associated with Task-Technology Fit.
Hypothesis 2: Security Technology Characteristic Linkage to TTF. The
factors that will be measured are directly linked to TTF, which are production
timeliness, system reliability, and IS relationships. Production timeliness
provides the ability of a user to schedule reports or run automated tasked jobs
with the expectation that the system will provide an output within the time frame
required. System reliability consist of having the HIS to be available when
needed without unexpected or lengthy downtimes, and the third variable of IS
relationships with users consists of ensuring the IS has the flexibility to meet the
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changed business needs of the user of the system. The measured factors of
security technology characteristics are effectively the computer resources of
hardware, software and data that must be protected. A stable relationship between
security technology characteristic factors in relation to computers, software, and
data signals a link of TTF; therefore, the following hypotheses will be tested.
H2: Security technology characteristics will be associated with Task-Technology
Fit.
3.4.2 Hypotheses Component B
Hypothesis 3: HIS Security Performance Impacts. Performance impacts are
affected by healthcare task and by HIS security technologies that are evaluated by
the user based on the results of the TTF fit. The performance impacts should be
positive, if the task fits the technology. Combining the constructs of the research
model provides a means to measure the factors to determine the level of
effectiveness, efficiency, and satisfaction to complete a task, with the given
heterogeneous and disparate systems. If the healthcare task characteristic and HIS
security technology characteristics fit, the healthcare workers will complete their
task, and there will be an impact on the system, and IS security controls can be
confirmed. Additionally, if the healthcare task characteristics and HIS security
technology characteristics fit, TTF correlates with HIS Security Performance;
therefore, the following hypothesis will be tested.
H3: Task-Technology Fit is associated with HIS Security Performance Impact.
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3.5. Research Method
This research study is exploratory in nature and used a single case design
approach with embedded units as specified by Yin (2009). As Yin stated, “a case
study is an empirical inquiry that investigates a contemporary phenomenon in
depth within its real-life context, especially if the boundaries between
phenomenon and context are not clearly evident” (p. 18). According to Yin,
experiment and survey methods are limited in their approach when investigating
contemporary phenomenon. Experiments typically remove a phenomenon from
its context by focusing on a few variables, while survey method designers focus
on having an acceptable amount of variables analyzed to ensure they have the
proper amount of respondents for the study, which essentially can limit the
investigation. Based on Yin’s assertions, the case study approach is a method that
can be used to address a phenomenon and context in real-life situations
thoroughly addressing data collection and data analysis strategies respectively.
This study was conducted using the positivist case study perspective and
paradigm. According to Guba and Lincoln (1994), the positivist paradigm has
three dimensions: the first is the ontological position which states that an
objective reality is assumed which can be systematically and rationally
investigated through empirical investigating and is driven by causal laws that
apply to social behavior. The second dimension is the epistemology position
wherein the researcher and the phenomenon being investigated are assumed to be
independent and the research remains detached, neutral and objective. Guba and
Lincoln believe that any reduction in independence is a threat to the validity of the
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study and should be reduced by following prescribed procedures. The third
dimension noted by Guba and Lincoln is the methodological position which calls
for general theories to be used to generate propositions that are operationalized as
hypotheses and subjected to replicable empirical testing.
Executing a positivist case study essentially requires the researcher to
understand that there is a single reality that the subjects of the study will express;
therefore, the researcher must observe and measure the phenomenon adhering to
the traditional validity and reliability tests used in the natural sciences (Yin,
2009). This study followed the guidelines of Yin (2009), Dube and Pare (2004)
and Lee (1991) in executing this approach. In essence, this study follows a
natural science approach, while applying the three-level framework of subjective
understanding, interpretive understanding, and positivist understanding prescribed
by Lee. The framework allows the researcher to understand how human subjects
see themselves, the researcher interpreting and understanding the human subjects
under study, and lastly creating the test to explain the empirical reality that is
being investigated.
This case study analyzed usability failures in one healthcare organization that
has 128 medical centers that utilize multiple types of clinical and HIS to share
information across the United States. A usability failure develops from the user’s
inability to access an application or system with the sole purpose of obtaining
information to complete a task. The continuous development and expansion of
HIS to meet legislative mandates has, in some instances, impacted performance of
the healthcare worker. The performance impact was measured in the form of
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usability failures, which often become an organizational security issue in an effort
to provide HIS users a means to access information in a timely and secure manner
(Braz & Robert, 2006).
This research study captured and identified the nature and types of reported
usability failures from the 128 medical centers to determine how alignment
problems between the HIS security technology and the healthcare task can have
an impact on HIS security performance. The nature and types of usability failures
was analyzed based on the type of task-related and technology-related usability
failures respectively. Ten usability failure cases were randomly selected: five
representing task-related usability failures, and five representing technologyrelated usability failures. The ten selected usability failures cases essentially
encapsulate the single case study design with embedded unit of analysis.
3.5.1 Unit of Analysis
Yin (2009) stated that the selection of the unit of analysis occurs when the primary
research questions are accurately specified. Selecting well-focused research questions
allows for the unit of analysis to be formed, which, according to Yin, is the “case” being
studied and allows for time boundaries to establish a beginning and ending point for the
study. Based on these parameters, the unit of analysis for this research study is the
usability failure identified and captured in a large healthcare organization by users of an
HIS. The unit of analysis aligns with the research problem, the research questions, and
hypotheses used to build the foundation of this research study. Furthermore, the
identified and captured usability failures were decomposed into two subunits consisting
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of task-related and technology-related usability failures respectively. The two subunits
create the embedded case study and were the focus of analysis.
3.5.2 Participants
The participants in this research study are healthcare workers who reported
usability failures while working to complete a task and the support staff personnel
assigned to resolve the problem. The healthcare workers who reported usability
failures were selected by the systematic sampling method using the “kth” record
on the list. The term “kth” is defined as the number between 0 and the size of
sample to be selected (Salkind, 2006). The research study participants consisted
of members from 14 states and 12 medical centers. The names of the participants
and the name of the medical centers will remain anonymous. Of the list of
candidates interviewed, nine were IT specialists, five were nurses, three were
product application specialists, two were program analysts, and one each of a
human resource specialist, pharmacist, and a medical administrative specialist
respectively. Based on the size of the population and the sample size of usability
failures, ten cases were selected for this study. This researcher is a member of the
organization that has direct access to the data under study. The process of gaining
access to the organization and receiving approval to conduct the study was
provided at the conclusion of the Institution Review Board process.
3.5.3 Data Collection
According to Bonoma (1985), collecting different types of data by different methods
from different sources produces a wider scope of coverage and may result in a fuller
picture of the phenomenon under study. Yin (2009) noted that the most important
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advantage presented by using multiple sources of evidence from data collection is the
development of “converging lines of inquiry” (p.42) which is a process of triangulation
and corroboration for the study. Triangulation occurred in the data collection process in
two phases. The table below lists the data collection steps for this research study. The
first phase consists of gathering information from the organization’s help desk database
where usability failures are reported, along with collecting documentation of
organizational records that reflect the practices and policies used to support the
technology that is used and developed in the organization.
Structured Query Language (SQL) was used to retrieve help desk records of reported
usability failures dating back five years. The query retrieved all records within the time
frame of September 1, 2008, to September 31, 2013, of help desk tickets that required an
intervention by the development staff. The captured help desk records followed a fourphased process that created codes and categories to identify the nature and types of
usability failures. Phase two of the data collection process and another form of
triangulation consisted of conducting semi-structured interviews with the case study
participants. Phase two data collection process, the researcher conducted 22 semistructured interviews guided by the theoretical framework of the study. There were 15
usability failures cases selected 9 usability failures were task-related failures, while 6
were technology-related failures. The interview data were transcribed, coded, and
analyzed using the Atlas.TI qualitative analysis tool.
The data collected and analyzed from the organization along with the confidentiality
of the participants was preserved throughout this research endeavor by substituting the
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participant names with codes. The following information further describes the two
phases of the data collection process.
Table 1
Data Collection Technique
Data Collection Steps for this
Yin
Pare
Sarker & Lee
Research Study:
(2009)
(2004)
(2003)
Database Repository
X
X
X
Company Documents
X
X
X
Emails
X
X
X
Interviews (Formal & Informal)
X
X
X
Note. The “X” in the data collection technique table represents triangulation for
this research study through construct validity, external validity, and reliability as
prescribed by Yin (2009).
3.5.4 Data Collection Phase One
The purpose of phase one of the data collection process is to identify and
capture the nature and types of reported usability failures in the healthcare
organization. The healthcare organization in this study stores the data to be
collected in an Enterprise Solutions Support (ESS) database in Figure 3. The ESS
database is a repository of the cradle-to-grave information of all problems
reported by the users in the organization along with the information of the
solutions provided by the organization. The information is captured and stored in
a relational database that links data elements into categories that list the task,
technology, user information, and a description and summary of the usability
failure. The categories in which the data are stored are the bridge that was used to
create the coding structure for phase two of the data collection process. The SQL
query created returned reported usability failures that required an intervention by
the development staff. This researcher postulates a usability failure that required
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an intervention by development staff is of a serious nature and can be linked to
the misalignment between a task and technology.

Figure 3. Enterprise support solutions screen capture
Collecting and analyzing such data gets to the core of the studied
phenomenon. The returned data lists the support case identification number, the
date the problem was reported, type of usability failure, the application interface
or system used, a summary and description of the problem, the name of the user
that encountered the usability failure, the failed task, and the name and location of
the organization.
Once the data are collected from the database, a key word search was
executed in four stages focusing on the summary and description fields of the
extracted data. Figure 4 list the four data collection stages that were used in phase
one of the data collection process. Further, a list of key word search terms is
listed in Appendix B. The first key word search stage used anecdotal terms used
to describe usability and technology failures in this healthcare organization. The
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anecdotal terms are derived from applications, systems, and communication
failures reported by members of the healthcare organization under study.

Figure 4. Phase one data collection stages
The second key word search stage used a form of axial coding prescribed by
Strauss and Corbin (1998) to further identify additional categories of usability
failures that were discovered from the first stage of the key word search. Axial
coding is a process used to reassemble and capture data that were fallout from the
previous stage of captured, categorized and coded data. The third key word
search stage incorporated the terms used by Goodhue and Thompson (1995) to
identify the attributes of the eight TTF factors. The eight TTF factor attributes
can directly link usability failures to a task characteristic or a technology
characteristic usability failure. The fourth and final stage is the capturing of
usability failures from the key word search. The collected usability failures were
analyzed to determine the nature and types of usability failures. Additionally,
collected usability failures were parsed into task characteristic and technology
characteristic usability failures, which essentially is the focus of the embedded
case study. The task characteristic and technology characteristics usability
failures went through a final review to ensure the usability failures have not been
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resolved by the support staff before data analysis begins. Final review required an
evaluation of additional information that was added to the initial reported
usability failure. The additional information provided by support staff added
more detail to the reported usability failure, and in some cases, required a
reclassification, and re-routing of the usability failure. Nonetheless, the additional
information ensured an accurate classification of the reported usability failure.
3.5.5 Data Collection Phase Two
The purpose of phase two of the data collection process was to conduct semi-structured
interviews to understand how usability-related information system security failures
impacted task accomplishment in a healthcare setting. Yin (2009) suggested conducting
a pilot study to help researchers to determine the appropriate unit of analysis, to refine the
data collection instruments, and/or to familiarize the researcher with the phenomenon
itself. Having a clear unit of analysis, and data collection process, along with a good
understanding of the phenomenon, a pilot study was not required. Therefore, semistructured interviews are used when the researcher knows most of the questions to ask but
cannot predict the answer (Pare, 2004). Twenty two semi-structured interviews were
conducted via the telephone with healthcare workers and support staff personnel who
reported or supported the usability failures from the data collection process. A summary
of the interview process is discussed in the phase two data collection process in Chapter
5.
The present study follows the IS research of Levina (2005) and Beaudry and
Pinsonneault (2005) who conducted qualitative case study design consisting of
semi-structured interviews from the range of 17 to 20 participants in less than a
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year’s time frame. Levina (2005) conducted a longitudinal qualitative field study
of web application development projects to understand collaborative practices that
unfolded from diverse members of a project team. Beaudry and Pinsonneault
(2005) explored the strategies users chose in an effort to adapt to new IT
introduced into a banking environment. Both research studies share features that
are similar to this current study; however, the number of interviews that were
conducted, ended when theoretical saturation was met. Theoretical saturation is
the point at which gathering additional data about a theoretical category reveals
no new properties nor yields any further theoretical insights about the emerging
grounded theory (Charmaz, 2006).
According to Yin (2009), there are two jobs to be accomplished during the
interview process: (a) follow the line of inquiry as reflected by the case study
protocol and (b) ask (conversational) questions in an unbiased manner that also
serves the needs of the line of inquiry. The interviews addressed the research
questions and test the hypotheses while also evaluating TTF theory based on the
answers provided. The complete list of semi-structured interview questions is
listed in Appendix C. Applying both interview processes recommended by Yin
created a rapport that allowed the respondents to provide the insight and answers
to the phenomenon under study.
3.5.6 Data Analysis
Data analysis began upon the conclusion of the data collection process after the
interview data have been transcribed into text. Table 2 lists the data analysis steps that
fulfill internal validity through pattern matching, coding, memo writing, computer
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assisted tool (Miles & Huberman, 1994) and hypothetico-deductive logic (Lee, 1991).
The primary data analysis technique of Miles and Huberman (1994) is used where coding
of the transcribed data was completed line by line. Codes are tags or labels for assigning
units of meaning to the descriptive or inferential information compiled during a study
(Miles & Huberman, 1994). Each line of text analyzed from the interviews was linked to
the set of codes developed for this study. Code development and reliability were
established by linking specific terms from the categories of reported usability failures
established by the organization to the TTF theory. The linkage provides the level of
inter-code reliability and agreement by projecting a logical flow and meaning of
identified and captured usability-related information systems security failures. The
transcribed interviews were placed into the case study database, where each interview
was coded to extricate the answers sought from the research problem of the study.
Table 2
Data Analysis Technique
Data Analysis Process
for this Research Study:
Yin (2009)
X

Miles and
Huberman
(1994)
X

Lee (1991)
X

Pattern Matching
Hypothetico-deductive
logic
X
Coding (Axial & Pattern)
X
Memo Writing
X
X
Computer Assisted Tool
X
X
Note. The “X” in the data analysis technique table represents the data analysis steps to
reach internal validity, along with triangulation prescribed by Yin (2009).
Through the application of hypothetico-deductive logic, as suggested by Lee (1991),
data analysis tested the premise to reduce usability security failures; organizations must
align security technology with tasks performed by healthcare workers and ensure that
such alignment does not hamper security performance in a healthcare organization.

49
Following the preferred practices of Miles and Huberman (1994), the data analysis
followed primarily a three-step process while also incorporating a contingency plan of
revaluating the data analysis method to ensure theoretical saturation is fulfilled. The first
step consists of the creation of a list of start codes before the interview phase is
conducted. The initial start list codes are created from the research problem, research
questions, research model, factors from the theoretical model, and hypotheses. For
example, the theme of this research study is to understand the nature and types of
usability failures in a healthcare setting; therefore, a start list code of “UF” which
indicates a usability failure.
The second data analysis step is the development of pattern codes, explanatory or
inferential codes that identify an emergent theme or explanation (Miles & Huberman,
1994). Pattern coding allows the grouping and summarizing of sub-codes, themes and
constructs that are discovered from the interview process. In this data analysis process,
pattern coding was conducted with the assistance of a computer-aided software tool,
Atlas.TI. Atlas.TI is a tool that assists with coding and categorizing large amounts of
narrative text that are often collected from open-ended interviews. The third step of data
analysis is memo writing. Memo writing is the pivotal intermediate step between data
collection and writing drafts of papers (Charmaz, 2006). Memo writing allows for the
continued analysis of the codes and data collected throughout the research process.
Memo writing was conducted at the end of each interview and after the codes and data
have been assigned after the transcription process. Constant memo writing allows
connections to develop, comparisons to be made, and the crystallization of questions and
directions to pursue within a research study (Charmaz, 2006).
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3.5.7 Reliability and Validity
Research design is supposed to represent a logical set of statements by which one can
test and judge the quality of the design using the concepts of trustworthiness, credibility,
conformability, and dependability (Yin, 2009). Yin (2009) recommended the use of
construct validity, internal validity, external validity, and reliability respectively as the
methods to test the quality of the case study. Construct validity was established by
creating a chain of evidence. To increase reliability of a case study, Yin (2009) lists six
sources of case study evidence: (a) documentation (b) archival records, (c) interviews,
(d) direct observations, (e) participant observation, and (f) physical artifacts. A chain of
evidence allows an outside observer to follow the trail of derived evidence from the
research problem to the research questions, on to the conclusion of the case study. For
this research study, construct validity was established using four out of the six sources of
case evidence: the collection of documentation, archival records, interviews, and physical
artifacts. The four sources of case study evidence was integrated into the case study
report, case study database, and case study protocol, which further establish external
validity and reliability for this study.
According to Yin (2009), internal validity seeks to establish a causal relationship
where certain conditions are believed to lead to other conditions distinguishable by
spurious relationships. Analyzing the data from the dialogue of healthcare workers and
support staff confirms the relationships developed from usability-related information
systems security failures. Following the data analysis steps suggested by several scholars
(e.g., Miles & Huberman, 1994; Sarker & Lee, 2003; Yin, 2009) confirms that internal
validity exists in this study.
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External validity is knowing whether a study’s findings are generalizable beyond the
immediate case study (Yin, 2009). The ability to capture a usability failure and linking
the failure to a specific task as well as the technology used to complete the task provides
a means to understand the factors that created the usability failure. Once the relationship
of the usability failure is established, an assessment of the failure can be determined,
which allows the means to address or reduce the usability-related information systems
security failure. The process used to study the nature of usability-related information
systems security failures can be applied in most organizations that provide IT support to
their staff. The key to obtaining generalizability is to understand when a usability failure
occurs. Identifying the interaction that takes place between the task and the technology
determined the effect the usability failure has on performance.
Reliability is obtained when the study can be repeated. Having a high level of
repeatability provides the creation of a credible research project. Reliability can be
verified by following the case study protocol developed for the case report. The case
study protocol contains the instrument as well as the procedures and general rules in case
study research to guide the investigator in carrying out the data collection from a single
case study design (Yin, 2009).
3.6 Summary
In this chapter, the theoretical basis was discussed along with the
methodology to address the research questions, and hypotheses of this study. The
use of a single case study design with embedded units allows for the phenomenon
of usability security failures to be identified, understood, and linked to a specific
type of task and technology used in a HIS. The data collection and data analysis
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process provides the reliability and validity that not only provides the credibility
and repeatability of this research endeavor, but it also creates the ability for many
organizations and disciplines, particularly the HCI community a perspective of
evaluating usability and security issues in a different vein. Lastly, a chain of
evidence was provided, including the case study protocol, case study report, and
case study database, which is available for outside observers.
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Chapter 4
Case Study: Phase One Data Collection and Analysis
4.1 Introduction
The aim of this chapter is to describe the complete phase one data collection
and data analysis process. The purpose of the phase one data collection and data
analysis process was to address the first research question “What are the nature
and types of usability-related information security failures in a HIS?” In the data
collection phase one process, a SQL query was created to retrieve help desk
records of reported usability failures dating back five years. The query retrieved
all records within the time frame of September 1, 2008, to September 31, 2013, of
help desk tickets that required an intervention by the development staff. Help
desk tickets are stored in a database repository of cradle-to-grave dialogue of
information of all problems reported by the users in the organization along with
the information of the solutions provided by organizational staff. Analyzing the
discourse between healthcare workers, support staff, and development teams
allowed the identification and enhanced understanding of usability-related
security failures and how the failures impact IS security performance within the
healthcare organization.
Help desk tickets that require an intervention by the development staff are
those that could not be resolved at the medical center or by the second-level
national support teams. To apply the appropriate context to the problem under
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study, from this point forward, help desk tickets will be referred to as usability
failures.
After the identification of the usability failures, a priori coding methods
applying terms that describe and define the definition of TTF theory, the CIA
triad, and the manner in which the organization under study classified and
reported user problems provided the foundation of code and category
development. Sub codes, codes, sub categories, and categories were the process
that wove the identification, classification, theming, and understanding of
usability failures in the organization. The following section describes the detailed
approach to identifying and understanding the nature and types of usability
failures.
4.2 Organization
The history of the current Veterans Affairs department (VA) can trace its roots
back to 1626. From 1776 to 1811, to 1911, all which were prominent times in the
history of the United States, specifically in times of national and international
conflict, the sacrifice of American soldiers and their families was recognized by
United States elected officials with the establishment and continual
transformation of the VA to support the nation’s veterans. The transformation
consisted of providing medical and hospital treatment for all injuries and diseases
of veterans, whether or not of service origin, along with the providing programs
for disability compensation, insurance for service persons and veterans, and
vocational rehabilitation for the disabled. The VA is organizationally structured
into three main service lines: the Veterans Benefits Affairs (VBA), Veterans

55
Health Administration (VHA), and National Cemetery Administration (NCA).
The VHA is responsible for all VA healthcare services administered by VA
Medical Centers, Ambulatory Care and community-based outpatient clinics. The
focus of this study has been within the VHA organization; therefore, from this
point forward, only the VHA will be referenced in this study. The VHA is home
to the United States’ largest integrated health care system consisting of 128
medical centers, nearly 1,400 community-based outpatient clinics, community
living centers, Veteran Centers and Domiciliaries. The VHA employs more than
239,000 staff at the aforementioned organizational elements, providing
comprehensive care to more than 8.3 million veterans each year.
The VHA has an integrated healthcare system comprising a multitude of
disparate and heterogeneous computer applications and systems. Those
applications and systems are interoperable with VA system architecture composed
of multiple programming languages and a diverse number of operating systems
and hardware. Within the VHA, the Health Product Support (HPS) division are
composed of teams of IT specialists who provide ongoing support to operational
systems and are charged with analyzing the portfolios of existing products. The
HPS support teams ensure prompt and effective problem resolution of
organizational-deployed software, as well as ensure that such resolutions are
executed in the most cost-effective manner available. HPS employees provide
support to over 115 software applications. The 115 software applications along
with the interactions and experiences of the users of the applications are the
source of the study.
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4.3 Code and Category Development
Saldana (2012) stated that a code in qualitative inquiry is most often a word or
short phrase that symbolically assigns a summative, salient, essence-capturing,
and/or evocative attribute for a portion of language-based or visual data.
Charmaz (2001) described coding as the critical link between data collection and
their explanation of meaning. In the phase one data collection process, code
identification was derived from the words and short phrases of users of the
organization who encountered and reported usability failures. The usability
failures reported by the study participants are the critical link that leads to theory
testing in this study. The evolution of code identification to code creation was
performed by capturing and synthesizing the words from study participants who
reported usability failures to words that led to defining TTF theory and the CIA
triad. The combination of TTF theory and the CIA triad is the link that identifies
information system security failures. For example, when users report that they are
unable to access a software application while attempting to complete a task, the
phrase “unable to access” symbolizes that there was a potential task failure and a
potential technical security failure. Therefore, an “unable to access” code is
created. Further exploring the “unable to access” code can explain the root cause
of the problem, as well as the user experience which essentially leads to testing
the hypotheses in this study.
Code creation in this study follows the method prescribed by Miles and
Huberman (1994). Miles and Huberman suggested creating start codes from the
research problem, research questions, research model, factors from the theoretical
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model, and hypotheses. Following Miles and Huberman was the starting point in
the code-creation process. The second step in the code-creation process was the
data analysis step wherein patterns in the data are declared, termed pattern coding.
Pattern codes are explanatory or inferential codes that identify an emergent theme
or explanation (Miles & Huberman, 1994). Pattern coding allows the grouping
and summarizing of sub-codes, themes and constructs that are discovered from
the interview process.
Capturing start codes was done using the a priori coding method. A priori
coding develops codes before the collected data are examined (Charmaz, 2006).
In this research study, a priori codes were developed during first cycle coding to
create start codes using the terms and conditions that caused usability failures.
First cycle code review led to the extrication of 660 usability failures that
ultimately developed the list of identified usability failures. The codes used to
identify usability failures were organized into a hierarchy based on the TTF
construct of task characteristic failures and technology characteristics failures.
The hierarchical grouping were constructed iteratively through the development
of sub codes transforming into codes, to codes transforming into sub categories, to
sub categories transforming into categories that identified the nature and type of
usability-related information systems security failures.
4.3.1 Code Development and Analysis
The foundation of code development was derived from the ESS screen capture
(see page 44). The ESS screen capture depicts three key fields (a) Category, (b)
Type, and (c) Item (CTI) that are essentially communicated to support staff
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personnel the nature of the usability failure. In figure 3, the category describes
the type of system the healthcare worker attempted to use, while the type
represents the application used, and the item represents the problem the healthcare
worker encountered. Applying the CTI, this research study is able to develop a
taxonomy of usability-related information systems security failures based on both
healthcare task characterizations and security technology characteristics
respectively. The process used to establish the usability-related information
systems security failure taxonomy followed the phase one data collection process
displayed in figure 4 (see page 45), applying the terms to each phase that is listed
in Appendix B.
The combination of CTI, along with the reported problem summary and case
log data created the sub code lists in Appendices D and E for both healthcare task
characteristic and security technology characteristic failures. The process that
classified whether the usability failure was task-related or technology-related was
determined by the CTI, the problem summary, and the TTF theory defined by
(Goodhue & Thompson, 1995). The initial task usability failure report in table 3
allowed the nature of the usability failures to be determined. The nature of the
usability failures are essentially the root cause of usability failures. The nature of
the usability failure was ultimately determined by the data from the case log,
primarily because the combination of perspectives from the healthcare worker that
reported the usability failure along with the support staff was required to
accurately identify and classify the problem. An example of the code analysis
process can be described by examining the first entry in table 3 as a reference.
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The type of task was determined by reviewing the CTI and the problem summary.
The first entry suggests that the healthcare worker encountered an application
failure attempting to complete the task of scanning an Intravenous Order. The
problem description states that there was an informational message presented that
consisted of an “invalid lookup error.” The “invalid lookup error” translates to an
“unable to retrieve information” usability failure. The inability of the healthcare
worker to retrieve information is the nature of the failure.
A second task-related usability failure example requires highlighting the
complex nature of diagnosing and troubleshooting usability-related information
systems security failures. The second row entry in table 3 captured the CTI of
HealtheVet-VistA. The HealtheVet-VistA CTI represents multiple disparate and
heterogeneous applications and systems interacting in an effort to assist the
healthcare worker complete a task. In this example, the healthcare worker was
unable to obtain information using the reporting tool using the HealtheVet-VistA
application and system. However, using a workaround of accessing the VistA
system (alternate HIS), the needed information was pieced together to complete
the task.
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Table 3
Initial Task Usability Failure Report
CTI
Problem Summary
Applications-VistA
Unable to scan IV
Inpatient Medications
orders
5.0
IV Orders Issue

Applications
HealtheVet-VistA

Multi-divisional
reporting needed

Case Log Summary
Local support, IRM, reports
nurses are unable to scan
particular IV orders. The
nurses are receiving the
following error message:
Invalid lookup, do not give.
The site will provide the IV
order numbers. The site does
have Remedy access and can
grant system access if needed.
The integrated data issue
relates to the medical center
location. It includes three
locations. This was a former
VISN, in which all medical
centers were merged.
Everyone was aware they were
seeing the data from other
medical centers. Everyone is
aware of the sharing of patient
information. Our major
problem is the reporting. They
cannot obtain reports for the
different medical centers,
which are identified. Med
center has been continually
using the NUMI application,
but cannot separate out the
RLOC data for medical center.
The wards are identified with
an alpha character representing
each site for most reports, so
people can select their MC
wards, but this option is not
available for RLOC and also in
the Physician Advisor report.

Table 4 provides a list of security technology characteristic usability failures
examples along with an explanation and interpretation of the data that allowed the
classification of the failure. Technology characteristic usability failures follows
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the same process as healthcare task characteristic failures by combining the CTI
with the problem summary to classify the nature of the usability failure. In table
4, the first example states that the Adverse Reaction Tracking application was
receiving undefined errors. The interpretation of the CTI error with the problem
summary suggest that the undefined error was due to data being missing that
prevented both the healthcare worker from completing their task, and the software
application from executing a programming step that would have created an
adverse reaction report on a patient. The classification of the usability failure
being technology-related was materialized by (a) missing data prevented the
software from executing properly, (b) the problem was linked to a software
execution failure, and (c) the healthcare worker was unable to complete the task
using a workaround, hence requiring the development staff to intervene to resolve
the problem.
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Table 4
Initial Technology Usability Failure Report
Category Type Item Problem
Case Log Summary
Summary
Applications-Vista
Receiving Error 58)<UNDEFINED>DSPLY+4^PSODGAL1
Adverse Reaction
(Undefined, Null *GMRAL(64395)13:43:09
Tracking 4.0
Subscript, etc.)
ROU:PUGR1PA04 11178 55)
<UNDEFINED>DSPLY+4^PSODGAL1
*GMRAL(64395)13:41:05
ROU:PUGR1PA01 9319 54)
<UNDEFINED>DSPLY+4^PSODGAL1
*GMRAL(64395)13:39:09
ROU:PUGR1PA04 27578 53)
<UNDEFINED>DSPLY+4^PSODGAL1
*GMRAL(64395)13:37:51
ROU:PUGR1PA05 15822 52)
<UNDEFINED>DSPLY+4^PSODGAL1
*GMRAL(64395)13:36:54
ROU:PUGR1PA01 20907 50)
<UNDEFINED>DSPLY+4^PSODGAL1
*GMRAL(64395)13:27:46
ROU:PUGR1PA02 12565 46)
<UNDEFINED>DSPLY+4^PSODGAL1
*GMRAL(64395)12:43:40
ROU:PUGR1PA04 24541 45) Let me
know who I can send the data information to
in encrypted outlook message.
ApplicationsEnrollment
We are having a problem with a patient's
HealtheVet-VistA
Systems
rated disability not showing an effective
Redesign
date. Our MAS Adpac says it shows in ESR
HL7 Messaging but is not crossing over to our Vista system.
Issue:
A second example of a security technology characteristic usability-related
information security failure requires discussing the Application HealtheVet-VistA
CTI in the second row of table 4. In this example, a data element is stored in the
VistA system; however the data element was not transmitted over to the
HealtheVet system. The programming code in the application between the VistA
system and the Enrollment system should have transmitted the data element to the
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HealtheVet system. In this particular example, the data element is required in
order to process a Veteran’s record on the HealtheVet system.
The CTI discussed earlier was not enough data to accurately classify task
characteristics and technology characteristic usability-related information systems
security failures. The dialogue from the summary field and case log fields listed
in figure 3 (see page 44) was also required to determine the nature and type of
usability failures. Table 3 lists examples of the initial failure report data from
healthcare workers that framed the code analysis and essentially led to the
classification of healthcare task characteristic usability failures. In essence a form
of triangulation was employed to the code analysis process in order to accurately
identify and analyze usability failures.
There were 660 records that followed the healthcare task characteristic and
security technology characteristic code analysis process, however only a few
examples are provided for understanding. Additionally, all duplicate sub codes
were eliminated leaving 44 healthcare task characteristic sub codes and 53
security technology characteristic sub codes.
The sub codes were collapsed into a set of codes by grouping sub codes that
were similarly related. For example, the sub codes of healthcare task
characteristic usability failure of access denied, access violation error, unable to
log into the system, user access violation, represents the code of access failure.
The security technology characteristic usability failure sub codes were collapsed
in the same fashion as the healthcare task characteristic usability failures. Using
the sub codes from Appendix E as an example, the sub codes of unable to transfer
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data, unable to transmit data, unable to upload data, unsolicited data merge,
unable to receive data, system created duplicate transmission represents the data
transmission code.
At the conclusion of first cycle code review, the second cycle code review
began. Second cycle code review was conducted to develop the categories
developed from first cycle code review. According to Saldana (2012), the
primary goal of second cycle code review was to develop a sense of categorical,
thematic, conceptual, and/or theoretical organization from first cycle coding. The
second cycle code review process allowed the transformation of sub codes into
codes, and codes into sub categories, and sub categories into categories.
Additionally, during the first cycle and second cycle code review development
process, the sub codes of “data” and “information” required distinct clarification
to properly understand and categorize usability-related information systems
security failures. This research study defined raw data as having no significance,
while information was defined as coming into existence when context was added
to data (Avison & Fitzgerald, 1995). To parse the difference between the two sub
codes in the identified usability-related information security failures, data-related
errors are presented under the group of security technology characteristics
failures, while information-related errors are presented under the group of
healthcare task characteristics failures. Data-related errors are errors discovered
at the database and database repository level prior to the conversion of data into
information, while information-related error are errors that occur after data are
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transmitted, received, and interpreted by the user where an action or response is
expected from the interaction with information.
4.3.2 Category Development and Analysis
Categories were formed via the analytical coding processing. The
establishment of categories in qualitative data analysis allows patterns to emerge
from the data. Lincoln and Guba (1985) suggest framing categories by applying a
process of classification and reasoning while using a tacit sense of intuitiveness to
determine what data look alike while grouping into categories when evaluating
codes to form patterns and themes. To manage, guide and refine the categories
being developed, the rule of inclusion was used (Maycut & Morehouse, 1994).
The rule of inclusion is a process where a category emerges followed by a
proposed statement about the category along with an example of the respondent’s
words that contributed to the formation of the codes. Examples of the rule of
inclusion used to develop pattern codes and themes are listed in Appendix F.
The category analysis process consisted of development terms that accurately
represented the combination of usability failures codes developed. Combining the
codes that were similarly related, to include the terms that defined TTF theory, the
CIA triad; along with the analyzing the dialogue of the usability failures framed
the categorical nomenclature. Additionally, the ESS repository user interface
screen depicted in figure 3 (see page 44) are comprised of a combination of fields
(CTI, summary field, and case log) that formed the code and category
development. Analyzing the CTI along with the summary field and case log
allowed this research study to classify task-related and technology-related
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usability failures. The healthcare task characteristic failures are comprised of the
terms and attributes that describe healthcare task-related failures that healthcare
workers encountered interacting with applications and systems. The security
technology characteristic failures are comprised of the terms and attributes that
describe security technology-related failures that healthcare workers encountered
interacting with application and systems, however the distinct difference between
healthcare task-related failures and security-technology related failures are that
security technology failures are failures that (a) missing data prevented the
software from executing properly, (b) the problem was linked to a software
execution failure, and (c) the healthcare worker was unable to complete the task
using a workaround, hence requiring the development staff to intervene to resolve
the problem. The combination of code and categorical analysis provided the
avenue for establishing a distinct difference among usability failures. The
following paragraphs describe both the code and category development and
analysis process.
4.3.3 Healthcare Task Characteristic Failure Categories
Construction of the task failure category code group was refined by grounding
the sub codes, codes, and sub categories with the terms that provided clarity to the
evolution of usability-related information systems security failures from a task
failure in a healthcare organization. The two major categories in the task failure
category group are Task Failure and Application Failure. The task failure
category is the origin of encounters and interactions users of an HIS have and
report within the organization under study. The encounters and interactions will
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provide a source of information to understand the synergy created when usabilityrelated information systems security failures materialize while using the HIS. The
application failure category was created to capture the CTI that the healthcare
worker had the interaction failure. As discussed previously, the CTI represents
the combination of system, application, and task that the healthcare worker was
having an interaction with when the usability failure originally occurred. This
application failure category allows this research study to thoroughly analyze the
nature of the usability failure along with how the specific CTI affects security
performance. Evaluating the historical performance factors of the CTI via the
application failure category discussed in the case log entries of the usability
failure provided the needed perspective to empirically investigate usability
failures. The usability-related information systems security failures provide
informational messages when the users encounter failures. Combining the CTI
with the informational messages contributed to an enhanced understanding of the
nature of the failures. The sub categories of the two major categories of the task
characteristic code group will further explain the rationale in code and category
choice development for this study.
Task Failure. The task failure codes of access failures, interruption failures,
security failures, service request, training, and unexpected behavior failures are
the codes that surfaced from the usability failure reports. The codes of access
failures, interruption failures, security failures, and unexpected behavior failures
occur during the execution of a task using the HIS. Access failures along with the
security failure code errors are related to log-on issues or problem with the
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software handling a user’s security credentials. In essence, the user interface is
where the interaction begins and ends with the software user. User interface
literature primarily focuses on developing better interfaces (Shneiderman, Jacobs,
Cohen, & Plaisant, 2009), and security for the interfaces (Bourimi et al., 2012;
Brostoff, 2004); however, the combination of the former and latter approaches
poses challenges, while leaving security in question. Interruption failures error
codes are encountered by users when the software prevents task completion. It is
commonplace that the software will provide an informational message suggesting
the cause of the failure. The unexpected behavior failures error code is when the
software performs in an unexpected manner. In those instances, the task could
have been completed, but the end results were not expected which must be
investigated to determine the potential risk that may exist to the HIS. Service
request and training codes are requests the users of an application or system
makes to support staff to improve upon the HIS or ask to learn how to
appropriately use the HIS.
Application Failure. The application failure category provides an anchor to
connect the type of task failure to a specific application failure down to the root
cause of the healthcare task characteristic usability failure. Combining the task
failure, application failure, and root cause of the problem essentially created a
method to capture, identify, and understand non-technical usability-related
information systems security failures. Having multiple types of informationrelated failures, there was a need to establish sub categories to appropriately
manage codes and categories, therefore two sub categories were created. The sub
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categories of Information Quality (IQ) and Information Security were created.
The IQ codes of display failures, inaccurate failures, inconsistent failures,
incompatible failures, and report error failures were codes that surfaced with a
high level of frequency from reported usability failures. The IQ codes were not
errors generated and returned by the software application after a failure was
identified by the application. Rather, IQ failure codes were detected by the users
of the HIS as a result of viewing the feedback from a task that appeared to have
been executed correctly. IQ has been discussed extensively in IS research
literature and has been dubbed a critical success factor to an IS by Delone (2003)
and Delone and McLean (1992). IQ is the fitness of the use of information, and is
a multidimensional concept (Ballou, Wang, Pazer, & Kumar, 1998; Wang &
Strong, 1996) with dimensions of accuracy, consistency, interpretability,
timeliness, and completeness. In the healthcare context, IQ errors such as the
inability of a healthcare worker to display data or a graph, as well as healthcare
workers reporting they were receiving inaccurate, inconsistent, and incompatible
information can result in serious negative consequences. An example of received
inaccurate, inconsistent, or incompatible information is the healthcare worker
receiving the wrong results of a patient’s blood test. The application may provide
an informational message stating an error, in which the healthcare will evaluate
the information by checking the blood test results against another clinical source
where the inaccuracy, inconsistency, or incompatibility error confusion can be
addressed with absolute certainty. The report error code also create a high level
of concern, particularly when healthcare organizations conduct critical incident
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investigations, as healthcare workers and administrators use reports as one of the
tools to evaluate medical incidents. The information gleaned from medical
reports has the potential to save lives.
Information Security Failure. The information security failure codes of
misinterpretation failures, mismatch failures, missing failures, and unavailable
failures are codes that surfaced with a high level of frequency from the usability
failure reports. The information security codes are similarly discovered as the IQ
codes. They are typically not codes that are generated from the software
application; they are codes discovered by the users of the HIS while attempting to
complete their task. The information security codes were adopted via the in vivo
coding process by using the exact words of the user who reported the failure. For
example, the HIS user would have received information that he or she was unable
to interpret correctly—thus stating it was “misinterpreted.” Healthcare workers
stated they received “mismatched” information, as well as information was
“missing” or “unavailable.” What distinguishes the difference between IQ failure
sub category codes and information security failure sub category codes as it
relates to the handling of information lie in the results and actions of the user
when encountering the failure. The information security sub category seeks to
understand from the participant of the study, the role and relationship a usability
failure had on information security. In this study, the expectation was to have the
user security practices unveiled through the steps chosen by the users when they
encounter handling misinterpreted failures, mismatched failures, missing failures,
or unavailable failures. This approach has been discussed by Wier, Douglas,
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Richardson, and Jack (2010), in that security is not the main goal of a user’s
interaction with a computer system; moreover, Post and Kagan (2006) asserted
that employees in an organization are more likely to bypass security measures in
order to complete a task. Hence, discussing and evaluating the thoughts and
actions of a user after an information security failure gained new insight on how
to address such failures.
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Figure 5. Healthcare task characteristic failures
4.3.4 Technology Failure Categories
Security Technology Characteristic Failures. The primary categories that
emanated from the pattern coding process are system production failure, system
reliability failure, and network connectivity failure. The codes in the technology
characteristic code grouping are related to hardware components that comprise a
HIS. In the healthcare environment, the HIS falls into four major categories: (a)
clinical, (b) management, (c) strategic decision support, and (d) electronic
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networking and e-health applications (Austin & Boxerman, 2003). Clinical
information systems support patient care; management information systems
support non-patient care activities; decision-support systems assist senior
managers in the area of strategic planning; and electronic data exchange and
networking allows a healthcare organization to connect to national databases as
well as to communicate with all users connected to the network. The security
technology characteristic failure category grouping is shaped by both the HIS
categories and Goodhue and Thompson’s (1995) definition of technology
characteristics: meeting the day-to-day operational needs of the users of the
system. The information security context is applied and evaluated using the
security requirements of confidentiality, integrity, and availability when the
source of the usability failure is linked to the HIS.
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Figure 6. Security technology characteristic failures
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The system production failure category consists of data security failure, data
storage failure, data transmission failure, flexibility failure, operations failure,
and reporting failure codes. The system production codes were discovered via in
vivo coding by analyzing the reported usability failure data. Data security failure
in this context is maintaining the integrity of information by healthcare workers as
they enter data into the information system. Data storage failure and data
transmission failures are the error codes reported by healthcare workers while
making data request from databases or data repositories. The codes of flexibility
failures, operations failures, and reporting failures are related to the feedback
provided by the users as they access and use the information systems in an effort
to complete their task. More specifically, as users of an HIS task and work
processes change, the users will need the HIS to adapt and provide the flexibility
needed to complete their task. For example, a new task request can be issued that
requires the healthcare worker to run a report on a new outpatient clinic that is a
division of a medical center. If the healthcare worker is unable to run a query to
obtain the data, due to programming restrictions, the programming restrictions
was the essence of a technical failure with the root cause being that the HIS did
not have the “flexibility” required for the healthcare worker to complete the task.
System reliability failure category codes were generated using the same
method and process used to identify system production codes. In vivo coding was
used to capture the high-frequency pattern codes reported by the users who
encountered failures. System reliability failure codes consist of informational
messages that the HIS user will receive back from an application or system while
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attempting to complete a task. The failure codes are incompatibility failure, crash
failures, delay failures, down failures, unavailable failures, and unresponsive
failures. The system reliability failure codes are centered on the users’ ability to
connect to a HIS. The HIS within the healthcare environment are disparate,
autonomous, heterogeneous systems, which can result in compatibility issues
during the interoperability phase of computer systems’ connecting and
communicating.
Network connectivity failure category codes were generated using the same
method and process that was used to identify system reliability codes. In vivo
coding was used to capture the high-frequency pattern codes reported by the users
that encountered failures. Network connectivity codes consist of authentication
failures, lost connectivity failures, and security failures. The authentication error
failure occurs as a user attempts to connect to an application or system while
using a network connection. The most common occurrence that has been
recognized in this healthcare environment is with web-based applications and
with disparate, autonomous systems. With the high number of applications and
systems connected to networks which are used throughout the healthcare
environment, authentication failures, loss of connectivity failures, and security
failures frequently occur when healthcare workers are unable to access software
applications or systems. The loss of connectivity error code is network-related,
while the security failure code is primarily related to a user’s inability to transmit
patient or confidential information via encrypted email or using file transfer
protocols to send or receive large amounts of sensitive data.
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4.4 Nature of Failures
To understand the nature of failures in this research study, the focus is on the
failed interactions a user had with the HIS. The failed interaction is a healthcare
task that was unable to be successfully completed or required other methods such
as a workaround to obtain a satisfactory result. Ammenwerth et al. (2006)
characterized the makeup of a healthcare task as comprising the wholeness of a
working process to be completed (e.g., nursing documentation, order entry, etc.)
by the user who is supported by the given technology. Focusing on the wholeness
of the healthcare task by evaluating usability failures that required an intervention
by development staff leads to understanding the nature of a failure. In the
organization under study, a healthcare task and healthcare technology failures are
linked to the inability of a user to accomplish his or her goal. The failure is
primarily due to data or information not being delivered through technology that
allows the necessary action to be taken based on established policies, standards,
and working processes within the organization.
The nature of a usability failure requires the discernment of task-related and
technology-related usability failures. The perception of task-related failures
within a healthcare environment is slightly skewed based on the manner in which
healthcare workers can mitigate their failures. Healthcare workers will use
alternative means such as a workaround to survive a task failure, however that
does not discount the ramifications of the task failures. The ramifications are a
lack of productivity and lost time when workarounds are pursued due to task
failures. Contrary to task failures, technology failures create a different reaction
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to healthcare workers in this study. Technology failures are caused by the tools of
data, hardware, systems, and services failing as healthcare workers attempt to
accomplish their tasks. Additionally, a technology failure in this research study
included task failures that were unable to be circumvented via workarounds,
which ultimately caused the reported usability failure to require an intervention by
the development staff, leaving the reported usability failure left unresolved.
A usability failure is the inability of a user to use a healthcare product to
effectively, efficiently, and satisfactorily to achieve his or her goal. Within the
information security domain, an information security failure is the inability to
protect the confidentiality, integrity, and availability, of the information. The
combination of healthcare task failures, technology failures, usability failures, and
security failures has transformed the aforementioned failures into usability-related
information systems security failures (see Figure 7). Therefore, the nature and
type of usability-related information system security failures consist of the
attributes and characteristics of healthcare task failures, technology failures,
usability failures, and information system failures respectively.
The attributes and characteristics of both healthcare task failures and security
technology characteristics failures are caused by information integrity issues
along with the unavailability of application and systems to healthcare workers.
Information integrity errors occurred when the information transmitted was not
the same as expected when it arrived to the healthcare workers and unavailability
errors occurred when the information including applications and systems was not
available to the healthcare workers at the time needed. Further, the terms and
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conditions that caused usability-related information systems security failures are
the nature of the usability failure, and was the foundation used to develop a set of
codes and categories that was used to evaluate and understand the nature and
types of usability-related information security failures.

Figure 7. Usability failure transition process model
4.5 Results
A total of 4,819 help desk tickets met the search criteria that captured and
identified usability-related information systems security failures. The 4,819
captured failures were streamlined into 660 usability failures. The code and
category connection is based on the TTF theory of (Goodhue & Thompson,
1995). The task characteristic code and category failure group linked back to the
five factors of TTF: quality, locatability, authorization, compatibility, and ease of
use/training. The technology characteristic code and category failure group
linked to the technical factors which are production timeliness, systems reliability,
and relationship with users. The usability failures were grouped into task
characteristic failure groups and technology failure characteristic groups
respectively. Combining the CTI from usability failures reported by healthcare
workers with the summary and case log data of usability-related information
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system security failures allowed for an accurate identification of the nature and
types of usability-related information systems security. The nature of a usability
failure is the cause of a usability failure applying the definition of TTF, CIA triad,
and anecdotal information provided by the ESS repository. The cause of usability
failures are linked directly to information integrity and the unavailability of
applications and systems. The combination of codes for the task characteristic
group, and the technology characteristic group addressed the first research
question “What are the nature and types of usability-related information security
failures in a HIS?” In essence, the data collection and data analysis cycle was
fulfilled following Miles, Huberman, and Saldana (2013), Charmaz (2006), and
Miles and Huberman (1994).
4.6 Summary
This chapter described the complete phase one data collection and data
analysis process to capture the nature and types of usability-related information
systems security failures. There were 4, 819 help desk tickets captured through a
SQL query that evolved from usability failures into usability-related information
systems security failures. Usability-related information systems security failures
were determined by the combination of healthcare task failures, technology
failures, usability failures, and information security failures. Defining the
combination of failures using TTF theory, the CIA triad, and the reported
usability failures led to identifying the nature and types of usability-related
information systems security failures in the organization. The code development
process advanced the construction of a coding scheme for both task characteristic
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failures and technology failures respectively. The coding scheme will aid in
phase two of the data collection and data analysis process.
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Chapter 5
Case Study: Phase Two Data Collection and Analysis
5.1 Introduction
The aim of this chapter is to describe the complete phase two data collection
and data analysis process. The purpose of the phase two data collection and data
analysis process is to address the second research question “How does usabilityrelated information systems security failures impact task accomplishment in a
healthcare setting?” In the phase two data collection process, the researcher
conducted semi-structured interviews guided by the theoretical framework of the
study. The interview data were transcribed, coded, and analyzed using the
Atlas.TI qualitative analysis tool. In addition to addressing the second research
question, the analyzed data tested the hypotheses in figure 2 of this study. The
following paragraphs will describe the details of the phase two data collection and
data analysis process.
5.2 Data Collection Process
Participant selection for data collection was based on systematic sampling
(Salkind, 2006). The query used to extract usability failures returned 660
potential usability failure cases. The systematic sampling process was started
with the first usability failure cases returned, and, from that point forward, every
4th usability failure case was selected in an effort to obtain ten usability failure
cases. The original goal was to analyze five task cases and five technology cases
totaling 20 interview participants; however, the participant pool decreased when
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approval was not granted to solicit participants from one of the departments, as
well as potential subjects declining to participate in the study. Based on the
decrease in the participant pool, from the 660 cases, the research study increased
the usability case analysis from 10 to 15. There were nine task usability-related
information security failure cases, and six technology usability-related
information security failure cases. The total number of participants in the study
increased from the projected 20 to 22.
Although the case study increased along with the number of participants, data
saturation was determined by cross case analysis (Miles, Huberman, & Saldana,
2013). Cross case analysis is primarily used when multiple case studies are
analyzed. As explained by Miles et al. (2013), cross case analysis can be used to
deepen understanding and explanation, while also pinning down data quickly that
allows understanding how general categories of data are related. By analyzing
usability failure cases separately first, data saturation was obtained at 15 usability
cases, and 22 participants when it was determined that there were no new data
being unveiled.
This research established the candidate pool by soliciting participation from
organizational users who directly experienced the phenomenon under study. The
research study participants consisted of members from 14 states and 12 medical
centers. The names of the participants and the name of the medical centers will
remain anonymous. The term participants and respondents will be used
interchangeably when discussing the interviewee. The participants were tracked
by referencing the task or technology failure, the case number being investigated,
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along with identifying the respondent by number. For example, if the first task
case failure was being investigated, and the first respondent of the case was being
interviewed, then the case was coded as TSKC1R1. The task is displayed as
(TSK), the case number is displayed as (C1), and the respondent is displayed as
(R1). Following the same scenario with a technology failure, the technology
failure was coded as TECHC1R1. In nine out of the 15 cases studied, the
researcher was able to get the perspective of two participants which enhanced the
analysis of the usability-related information systems security failures. In the
instances two participants were unable to be identified for a case; organizational
documents, archived records, and observing the participant reproduce the
usability-related information systems security failure provided research data to
further analyze the case. Of the list of candidates interviewed, nine were IT
specialists, five were nurses, three were clinical application coordinators, two
were program analysts, and one each of a human resource specialist, pharmacist,
and a medical administrative specialist respectively. The combined group of
participants had a total of 316 years of experience working in the organization.
5.3 Data Analysis Process
Phase one code and category development was guided by the TTF theory.
Code development guided by the theory used in this study is essentially
theoretical coding, a sophisticated level of focused coding that specifies the
possible relationships between categories developed during focused coding
(Charmaz, 2006). Glaser (1978) argues that theoretical codes preclude a need for
axial coding because they “weave the fractured story back together” (p.72).
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Using the definition provided by Goodhue and Thompson (1995) for TTF, task
characteristics construct is the actions carried out by individuals in turning inputs
to outputs, while the technology characteristic is viewed as tools used by
individuals in carrying out their task. Technology in this context is hardware,
software, data, and user support services. Category emergence will be discussed
later in this chapter.
5.3.1 Interview Process
The interview process for all participants was conducted by telephone, where
the researcher captured the data by taking notes. The interview process lasted
between 45 and 120 minutes, primarily due to the method used to collect the
interview data. Appendix G list the case study interview record. The interview
process consisted of the participant answering the interview question and
providing an opportunity for the interviewer to recite the answer as it was stated
to include an acknowledgement period whereby the participant agreed that the
answers were recorded accurately. During the interview process, special attention
was given to voice inflections of the participant to ensure the proper context of the
answer was recorded. Further, any emotions displayed by the participants were
questioned for understanding, allowing for an authentic analysis and reporting of
the answers provided. Ten semi-structured interview questions in Appendix C
were developed based on the theoretical framework to specifically address the
second research question and the hypotheses; however, additional questions were
asked to elicit the full meaning and understanding of the participants, while fully
addressing the research questions and testing the hypotheses.
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In conjunction with asking additional questions for clarity, two specific
questions were added to the interview that further enhanced the data analysis
process. The first question called for the participant to describe the originally
reported problem. The question allowed the participant to recount his or her
experience of the original interaction which ultimately added to the context that
the researcher was attempting to capture. In addition to capturing the
participant’s interaction, asking the question allowed the researcher to accurately
classify the cases under study with the appropriate usability-related information
systems security failure type. After confirming the identified problems under
study, the nine task characteristics usability-related information security failures
are listed in Table 5.
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Table 5
Task Characteristic Usability-related Information Systems Security Failure Cases
Sub
Case ID Nature of Failure Category
Category
Code
Sub Code
TSKC1
Unable to add
Task Failure
Unexpected
Unable to
information
Behavior
add
information
TSKC2
Solicited
Task Failure
Unexpected
Solicited
information
Behavior
information
unreturned
unreturned
TSKC3
Wrong
Application Information Inaccurate
Wrong
information
Failure
Quality
information
returned
returned
TSKC4
Information not
Application Information Display
Missing
displaying as
Failure
Quality
Information
expected
TSKC5
Wrong
Application Information Inaccurate
Wrong
information
Failure
Quality
information
returned
returned
TSKC6
Unable to access Application Information Unavailable
Unable to
information
Failure
Security
access
system
TSKC7
Unable to update Task Failure
Unexpected
Unable to
record
Behavior
complete
task
TSKC8
Unsolicited
Application Information Display
Incorrect
information
Failure
Quality
information
displaying
TSKC9
Unable to enter
Task Failure
Unexpected
Unable to
accurate
Behavior
enter
information
accurate
information
Of the nine types of task characteristic usability-related information systems
security failure cases, four of the failures types align with the task failure
category, while the remaining five cases align with application failure category.
Within the task failure category, the usability-related information systems security
failure cases are linked to the unexpected behavior code. The unexpected
behavior code is characterized by the user’s inability to manage information due
to the software providing an unexpected informational output preventing the task
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from being completed. The sub category of IQ usability-related information
systems security failure cases have codes that are linked to display errors, and
receiving inaccurate solicited and unsolicited information.
The technology characteristic usability-related information security failure
lists five cases in table 6 that are aligned with the system production category,
while the sixth case is aligned with the system reliability category. Within the
system production category, four of the cases are linked to the operations failure
code, one flexibility failure code, and one unavailability failure code respectively.
The technology characteristic usability-related information systems security
failure codes are characterized by users of the HIS inability to meet day-to-day
operational needs of the users of the system. The flexibility code corresponds to
adapting to the needs of the user, and the unavailable failure code represents
hardware, software, data, and support services are unavailable (Goodhue &
Thompson, 1995).
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Table 6
Technology Characteristic Usability-related Information Systems Security
Failure Cases
Case ID
Nature of Failure
Category
Code
Sub Code
TECHC1 Unable to update
System
Flexibility
Unable to
Database
Production
Failure
update data
TECHC2 Invalid Data
System
Operations Data
Display
Production
Failure
Inconsistencies
TECHC3 Incorrect Data
System
Operations Data Storage
Stored in Database
Production
Failure
Failure
TECHC4 Data Inconsistencies System
Operations Data
Production
Failure
Transmission
Failure
TECHC5 Missing Data
System
Operations Data Storage
Production
Failure
Failure
TECHC6 Data Unavailable
System
Unavailable Data
Reliability
Failure
Unavailable
5.3.2 Pattern Coding and Theme Emergence
A separate set of codes and categories were developed to extricate patterns
and themes that were discussed by the participants during the interview process.
These codes are essentially the transition point from the nature and types of
usability-related information security failures that were discovered through the
coding process to the information discovery process that will answer research
question two, and test the hypotheses of this study, while using TTF theory to
guide the analysis. The 20 codes generated during the code development process
were reduced to 11 after further code analysis created three major theme
categories. Applying in vivo coding from the interview transcripts were the
process used to generate the code set. According to Miles et al. (2013) in vivo
coding is appropriate for virtually all qualitative studies, but particularly for
beginning qualitative researchers learning how to code data, and studies that
prioritize and honor the participant’s voice. Figure 8 displays the hierarchy of
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patterns and themes developed which was prescribed by Charmaz (2001) and
Saldana (2012). The information security threat theme is the domain that house
and describe the pattern codes that were discovered during the data collection and
analysis process. The pattern codes are the area of focus within the domain and
theme of information security threat. In other words, the interview process
unveiled the information security threat of information integrity failures,
inadequate security policies, and user security actions.
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Figure 8. Pattern code and theme grouping
After the interviews concluded, the collected interview data were analyzed
based on the usability information systems security failure case groups and the
interview questions. For instance, all task characteristic usability information
systems security failures were grouped and separated by question, and all
technology characteristic usability information systems security failures followed
the same analysis pattern. In addition to analyzing each usability failure case
groupings, a comparison was done between the task characteristic group and the
technology characteristic groups to discover additional patterns and themes in the
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data. The following sections describe the major themes along with the
information gleaned from feedback from the respondents under study.
5.3.3 Information Security Threat Theme
The first theme emerged from pattern coding was the information security
threat theme. The pattern codes emerged as the participants described their
interaction with their respective software application and system. There were six
cases and 11 participants that provided data by which to analyze hypothesis two.
Four interview questions were developed to test the hypothesis. The predominant
code count consisted of information integrity failure (6), organization culture (6),
inadequate security polices (10), technology alignment assessment (11), and user
security actions (10). The less dominate codes were development challenges (3),
and support challenges (3). With respect to the dominate codes, inadequate
security policies, technology alignment assessment, and user security actions
were analyzed and determined to be the catalyst to the information security threat
in this study. When analyzing the interview data, the pattern codes of information
integrity failures, inadequate security policies, and user security actions arose as
the participants described the processes used to protect sensitive information that
had to be shared to solicit individuals in the organization that could provide
adequate support. Sensitive information was often extracted from their respective
applications and systems and transmitted via encrypted email. The manner in
which the respondents described how they managed sensitive and confidential
information were described by both respondents from task case 3, one respondent
from task case 6, along with tech case 2 respondent, where TSKC3R1 states: “I
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had to send the support staff the patient information via email. I sent the
information using an outlook encrypted email message.”
TECHC3R2 comment was: “We use test patients. We blanked out patient
names and ssns. We make sure no one can see screen names, and went
through all the security prevention steps, such as locking the computer screen.
Also use encrypted messages when patient data is sent via outlook mail.”
TECHC2R2 stated: “When we identify problem, we need information to talk
about the problem, it does include patient information. I sent tier 2 an
encrypted email message. Anytime we look at the error trap, it contains
sensitive information, we have to be very careful to how we display or send
the information.”
TSKC6R1 said: “I never had to give patient health information in this case.
What I have done in the past, I would send encrypted information with screen
shots of the data, or I would black out personal information as I provided a
screen capture.”
The respondents for both task and technology failures described how they
were in compliance with organization security policy in relation to handling
patient identifiable information. As the respondents discussed their reported
usability failure, it was clear that 99% of participants were aware of security
practices based on the dialogue. By the participants discussing their security
practices whether or not they had to handle sensitive information, they were
providing valuable insight that linked the inadequate security policy pattern code
to the information security threat theme. There was one outlier security policy
comment that questions how following the organization’s security policies can
also obstruct users from accomplishing their task as respondent from task case 1
shared by stating:
“I send personal identifiable information via PKI; however what I have found
is working with contractors pose a problem. The contractors that support the
EDIS servers, does not have PKI, therefore I have found it difficult to share
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the information needed to troubleshoot some of the problems. Contractors are
not held to the same standards as regular employees.”
Task case 1 response reflect that although the respondent was cognizant of the
organizational security policies, there was a clear level of frustration in how the
organization supports its support staff personnel by employing contract personnel
to develop and maintain applications. Contract personnel are not vetted for
employment in the same fashion as VA employees, primarily due to contract
personnel are hired to fulfill a task or job in a negotiated contract from a vendor.
The contract may not have fully considered the individual ability to obtain the
security clearance required to interact with confidential or private information.
The respondent was essentially highlighting how applying one dimensional
security controls (technical security) present additional challenges. Having
contract personnel that organizational staff cannot share confidential information
to provide accurate and timely support to healthcare workers negatively impacts
patient care, and highlights how information security threats arise when
organizational staff members are following organizational security policies. The
researcher postulates that organizational security policies are inadequate and
should be addressed when task accomplishment is negatively impacted when
members of the organization follow organizational security policies.
Additionally, the observation of this respondent also speaks to how software is
currently being developed within the organization.
In this study, healthcare workers threat to information security did not occur
from the actions the healthcare worker used to handle sensitive information. The
threat appeared from the misalignment of the healthcare task and technology used
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by the healthcare worker. The threat to security was linked to the inability of
healthcare workers to update data, data inconsistencies, data storage, and data
transmission complications. To assess the length and degree of the information
security threat related to the alignment of healthcare task characteristics with the
security technology characteristics, the participants were asked questions about
their ability to access the applications and systems used, to include the accuracy
of the information the users were receiving while utilizing the HIS. The dialogue
in which the healthcare workers expressed healthcare task-related and security
technology-related failures came from four participants that reported both taskrelated and technology-related failures. TSKC3R1 comments were: “Yes the
system is readily available. I can retrieve my information using the CPRS toolbar
as well as using roll and scroll VistA.”
TECHC2R2 said: “Yes the system is readily available. We also have system
monitors that tells us about system availability.”
TECHC1R2 said: “No the system is not providing accurate data. Since it is a
calculated extract data field element that we are trying to fix, it is not currently
accurate.”
TECHC1R1 said: “Yes it provides accurate and current information. It is
integrated and pulls information from various applications. It stays current.”
There are interesting contradictions in how users of an HIS perceive the
performance of their HIS. The contradictions are captured in analyzing the
responses from the participants as they described system availability and
performance. To highlight the contradictions, the reported usability failures that
were linked to information integrity and unavailability failures are listed along
with the respondents that was interviewed that were involved with the same
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reported usability failure. The case scenario below, TSKC1, discussed the nature
of usability failure which was classified as a healthcare worker unable to add
information:
“This was a national problem with the worksheet. The application would not
allow emergency room staff to put a patient in the room, assign a nurse or give
an acuity, until they assign a provider.”
Following the reported usability failure, the two respondents that encountered
and supported the usability failure had different points of views by saying:
TSKC1R1 stated “yes, the system is readily available.”
The second respondent (TSKC1R2), an IT specialist that provides national
support to multiple applications and systems said: “There is a problem where
data is being lost, based on how the architecture is setup. Network latency has
created the loss of a patient data from the emergency room board.”
The above case was a national problem that affected 128 medical centers. The
first respondent stated that the system is “readily available,” however what is not
reflective in this answer that was evident during the interview, was the comfort
and experience level the medical center employees had with the use of the
application. This particular medical center participated in the testing of the
application during the development process; therefore the medical center had a
level of knowledge and experience to manage task and technology failures that
simply did not exist for other medical centers. Respondent 2's perspective was
from a national perspective, thus the evaluation of the system being “readily
available” stemmed from viewing all 128 medical centers. This failure was an
information security failure, in that the integrity of information was called into
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question, along with the application and system not being available. In the case
described, the data discussed by the two respondents provided varying
perspectives of the state of the application; however both respondents were
consistent in the their answers as they reflected on their role by broaching topics
on information integrity failure, organization culture, and technology alignment
assessment that emerged from the information security threat theme.
A second example of contradictory responses in the failure description is seen
below, with TECHC3 when the healthcare worker reported:
We enter patient scores into the application. Once I put the data in, I had the
option of putting start goals, and finishing or following up scores. Those are
essential for us to do bench marking. If the type, start, goal, or finish date is
not entered, the application should not allow me to continue adding data in the
system. The application should not accept the case without having one of
those not entered. The care type for the episode of care is important, but with
the missing dates, the system was still working. That was wrong.
In the usability failure described above, there were four respondents that
provide their perspective to the failure below:
TECHC3R1, a registered nurse said, “yes, it is a user friendly application.”
TECHC3R2, an IT specialist said, “yes, the system is readily available. I have
direct access to the systems, so whenever users in the field start having access
problems, or notice delays, someone out in the field either calls me or send me
an email message asking me what is wrong with the system.”
TECHC1R, a registered nurse said, “yes it provides accurate and current
information. It is integrated and pulls information from various applications.
It stays current.”
TECHC1R2, an IT specialist said, “for individual patients yes. Aggregate
patients have issues. You sometimes cannot get the information you need
quickly, and you sometimes have to double check the information to make
sure it’s right.”
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The task and technology data gets to the core of the information security
threat theme healthcare workers have in common in this study. Healthcare
workers understand the importance of protecting patient information, therefore
following organizational security policies as it relates to sensitive information
translates well to employees. However, healthcare workers have a strong desire
to complete tasks that require them to protect patients, hence workarounds and
alternative tasks that may circumvent organizational security policies. Therefore
information security is more complicated in the healthcare environment with the
methods available to users to mitigate information integrity failures and the
unavailability of an application or system–thus a healthcare worker perspective
differs based on the amount of obstacles that are present that prevents or delays
task accomplishment. The question that is posed from the healthcare environment
in relation to the information security threat, is to how to reduce the methods
healthcare workers apply to mitigate information integrity failures along with the
unavailability of data, hardware, software, and support services? This researcher
postulates by evaluating inadequate security policies to address user security
actions have when healthcare tasks are not aligned with the technology promotes
security awareness and improves organizational security culture.
Based on the healthcare worker’s perspective, the understanding of how
information security was viewed was related to the codes of information integrity
failures, organization culture, inadequate security policies, technology alignment
assessment, and user security actions. Usability security failures along with the
impact of IS security performance was influenced by information integrity, and
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the unavailability of applications and systems used by healthcare workers. When
usability failures occur, the security of information is placed into jeopardy based
on the organization predominantly using technical security controls, along with
the healthcare worker having a strong desire to provide patient care in an effort to
complete their task.
Identifying usability security failures are a unique endeavor in this study.
While information integrity and the unavailability of information to users in the
healthcare environment are prominently displayed in the captured usability
failures, the root cause of the failures does not resonate to healthcare workers,
primarily because the healthcare organization culture is well-versed at mitigating
usability failures. Mitigating usability failures, coupled with the healthcare
organization primarily applying technical security controls required focusing on
the actions of the healthcare workers along with analyzing what was not said
while discussing and understanding their usability failures. The actions of the
healthcare workers under study explains how information security is applied
within the organization, as well as how IS security performance is impacted
during a usability failure. The dialogue captured within the information security
threat theme displays how the full cycle of the information security threat
materializes and is jeopardized when information integrity errors and the HIS is
rendered unavailable to its users.
5.3.4 Organizational Security Performance Impact Theme
The second theme that emerged from pattern coding is the organizational
security performance impact theme. The organizational security performance
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impact themes house the pattern codes of misaligned development processes,
misaligned support processes, and the role organizational culture plays. The
pattern codes gleaned from the interview process elicit the role each have on the
organizational security performance impact as presented by the respondents in
this study. The organizational support theme is understood from the combination
of healthcare task characteristic and security technology characteristic constructs
to determine the overall effects the failures have on an organization. Misaligned
development processes, misaligned support processes, and organization culture
were the patterns that formed to provide the imprint of the organizational security
performance impact theme. The amalgamation of healthcare task and HIS
security technology failure data was analyzed to determine the support needs of
healthcare workers while interacting with their usability-related information
systems security failure. To understand the HIS security performance impact,
which can be traced to organizational support, additional interview questions were
added asking the respondents to describe their specific usability-related failure
case along with how the user was impacted by the failure. With the combination
of all cases being used in the analysis of both the task characteristic and
technology characteristic usability failures, a combination of answers from the
information security threat theme and the usability assessment theme were used to
realize the ramifications the failures had on the healthcare workers, thus forming
the organizational security performance impact theme.
The organizational security performance impact theme data formed the pattern
codes where the participants described the exterior interaction from use of the
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HIS. The pattern codes that were formed were misaligned development
processes, misaligned support processes, and organization culture. The
participants regularly interacted with co-workers, and support staff as they
attempted to manage their failure encounter. The dialogue of how participants
responded to the usability failure they encountered in two instances were:
TSKC1R1, an IT specialist said: “After triage didn’t assign a provider in the
application, I submitted a helpdesk ticket to see if it was a new feature that is
being displayed in the application, or if it was a bug that caused the failure. It
was indeed a bug.”
A second respondent from TECHC2R2, an IT specialist that discussed a
technology failure stated:
“Sometimes I talk to the user and tell them that I found an error in the error
trap, and they may not recall or notice a problem. That indicates that the data
may not have been filed in VISTA correctly.”
TSKC2R2, an IT specialist stated: When the lab technician reported the
problem, she said it was urgent, since it was related to IV medication, I knew
it was important. It was not the type of medication that you can get from the
pharmacy, so I knew to respond quickly.
The manner in how users of the HIS interact inside and outside the
organization reflect how the organization culture pattern code emerged as a
member of the organizational security performance impact theme. Healthcare
workers and support staff members often interacted with subject matter experts at
other medical centers before helpdesk tickets are submitted. That interaction
process creates an opportunity of resolving usability failures in an expeditious
manner. The dialogue by the respondents reflect how usability failures are
analyzed at the beginning stages of a usability failure which leads to
understanding the role of organizational culture play in resolving usability
failures.
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The following dialogue below from two respondents reflects the mindset of
healthcare workers and support staff as they analyze and troubleshoot the
usability failure. The organization culture is displayed by the respondents as they
interact with the usability failure, and they are also providing a glimpse at both
misaligned development processes and misaligned support processes. The
experience healthcare workers provides often result in allowing support staff
members to better understand the usability failures as well as how the usability
failures impact the healthcare workers.
TSKC1R1 response while interacting with an application associated with the
emergency room follows: “I ran through the problem in our test account, and
noticed what was happening, so I was able to duplicate the problem in the test
account. The only troubleshooting we can do is add a patient, and go through
the process. There is not much troubleshooting that can be done with a webbased system, so all I could do was refer the ticket to tier 2 support.”
TSKC6R1, a utilization manager that was interacting with a reporting
application said: “I know it’s a new program, and when it rolled out, the
impact of this problem didn’t exist, so the functionality of this problem may
not have been realized. Let’s work on this to get fixed. My on-going reaction
is that it has gone on for many years, and it still hasn’t been fixed.”
The dialogue from task case 1, and task case 6 represents four challenges that
has been predominately discussed throughout the research study (a) the manner in
how applications and systems are developed and introduced into the organization
reduces the ability of support staff to support applications and systems, (b)
healthcare workers and support staff believes organization managers are not
providing the support required to allow the employees to accomplish their task
efficiently, (c) organizational managers have not recognized the impact of
usability failures have on healthcare workers, and (d) organizational security
performance is impacted on multiple levels when usability failures occur.
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The impact of usability failures are captured from two respondents, where
TECHC3R1, a registered nurse stated:
“I was upset. I thought I had done something wrong because I was new. I
reviewed my information, because I had written instruction and I put all the
information like I was supposed to, so when I didn’t have the score type, I
knew I had done it right. I tried putting in the score type, and it wouldn’t take
it, but it should not have accepted the application. I tried putting it in again,
so I was frustrated and confused, so I contacted the national team. I wanted to
have someone look at it to see if I was doing something wrong.”
The second respondent from TECHC3R2, a clinical application coordinator
stated:
“Initially, I got curious about how frequent this thing was happening, and
whether or not if it was a fluke, so I ran a Fileman routine on the order file to
determine if any other orders existed and whether there were additional
inpatient med orders that had a display group of outpatient and a few other
turned up. I determined that this was not a onetime problem, and that a
system failure was going on, and it was happening more than once.”
The dialogue from the participants covered in the above quotes highlight the
thoughts of individuals based on the experience level within the organization,
which ultimately encapsulates the organizational culture in respect to usability
failures. Participants drew on their experience to manage a usability failure, but
there are security implications around each failure, however information security
failures are not easily detected and are addressed appropriately based on the
nature of a usability failures because (a) the organization primary focus is on
technical security failures and (b) patient care may not have been identified as
being placed in jeopardy. The implications to this researcher’s assertion is that
the organization does not understand the risk usability failures present on the
organization or the risk is negligible based on other information assets that may
be placed at risk. The dialogue from TSKC9R, who is a pharmacist, discusses a
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clear usability failure that has caused the integrity of information to be placed at
risk:
“There is a field called Frequency in minutes. A field within the standard
schedule enter-edit option. So this field determines for inpatient medication.
It calculates when the next dose is due. The maximum number of that field is
129,600 minutes which is 90 days. We have medications right now in the
system that is dispensed every six months. So it obviously does not account
for that. That is the longest that I can account for, but I can imagine there are
medications that are longer than that—yearly.”
The respondent had more thoughts about the healthcare task failure:
“The system does not allow us to account for doses that are standard doses for
medication. It is set up to fail. It is no way for us to correct because the nurse
is going to be prompted to give this medication three months early. There is
no way for us to consistently notify the nurse that it needs to be given three
months later.”
The second usability failure captured is from a security technology-related
usability failure. The nature of the failure is the invalid data display which is
essentially an information integrity failure albeit presented differently when
TECHC2R1, a clinical application coordinator states:
“When pharmacist dispenses a medication to a patient, the provider or
pharmacist does not want to prescribe a medication that the patient is allergic
to. That’s the purpose of the assessment. Either you have reaction assessment
or you don’t have an assessment. You cannot have both. This particular
ticket had both.”
After questioning the respondent about the usability failure encounter,
TECHC1R1, a program analyst stated:
“I was not sure if the problem was related to the task or the process I was
trying to complete. The problem seemed to be tied to a programming error,
because of how the data was returned. This was a unique problem related to
one patient record. If that error was happening a lot that would make me think
it was a process problem.”
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The data from the respondents illuminate the complex relationship between
task, technology, and the user. An analysis is required to determine the cause and
resolution of the problem, therefore the dialogue that exists from a reported
usability failure is key to accurately adjudicating a failure. What must be brought
to the fore in the data described by the respondents is these cases have not been
slated for an intervention by the development staff. The healthcare workers
perspective is to protect the health of their patients, which includes personal
identifiable information, however the information security aspects of their
usability-related information systems security case failures are not known,
understood, or discussed by the participants.
According to the participants in this study, the fallout of the organizational
mandates and how software is implemented into the organization have created
organizational challenges with respect to both the support and development
processes. With the advent of web-based applications, and organization data
being re-located to data centers around the country, the organization now has a
host of support challenges. The support challenges are centered on the loss of
corporate knowledge, support staff reorganization, disparate support notification
and communication tools, and access to software and hardware, which all
ultimately result in poor response time to address problems, leaving a high
amount of problems unresolved. The dialogue below from the respondents
reflects the development of the organizational security performance impact theme
from the misaligned support processes pattern code.
TECHC3R1 thoughts were: “I am a registered nurse, in which have been
employed with the VA since 2000. I work with spinal cord veterans. It would
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be nice to have a troubleshooting guide for all users to have access to that
communicates a list of problems that the application is experiencing. That
way, when problems are not fixed it a timely manner; we would at least know
the cause of the problems to help us make decisions.”
TECHC2R2 stated: “I must say I have been a Clinical Applications
Coordinator since 1999. I usually research a problem before I log a ticket. I
know who to call, and I know where to look. In this particular case, there was
no explanation as to why the problem happened, and that’s why we logged the
ticket. We never got a resolution, and unfortunate the problem never
happened again, but I see from the transcript you sent me, the problem is still
open.”
TSKC1R2 stated: “I am an IT specialist that have been employed with the
VA for 30 years. Testing should have been better, and the problem would
have been discovered. The development team should have been held
accountable for the problem. The contractor was able to walk away from the
problem without fixing it, before the 30 day point.”
TSKC2R2 stated: “I am an IT specialist that have been working with BCMA
since 1987. I thought this problem had been fixed, because the development
team released an emergency patch to clean up the variable that was not being
renewed. It surprised me that you contacted me about this problem, and I was
shocked that they only fixed half the problem. The nurses are using a
workaround to clear IV drips.”
There are three points of clarity that the respondents have revealed in their
comments (a) the organization has highly skilled and experienced work force
(organization culture) that has the potential to provide insight to reducing
usability-related security failures, (b) there is a temporal element that is linked to
usability failures that has been exhibited, particularly in how this healthcare
organization addresses usability failures, and (c) the methods used to implement
and develop software within the organization is not totally in alignment with the
task the healthcare users are attempting to complete.
While respondents discussed their interaction with their support staff, the
interactions produced profound results from the experiences communicating with
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staff members within the organization. Two respondents linked to both healthcare
task characteristic failures along with security technology characteristic failures
articulated the user perspective in relation to the organizational security
performance impact theme when the following was shared:
TSKC1R2, an IT specialist stated: “There are project managers, and
developers that do not know the VA process. All they know is the PMAS
process, if they didn’t want to listen to the point of view of seasoned support
staff; they basically missed an opportunity to use corporate knowledge.”
TECHC4R2, a clinical application coordinator stated: “The field has no
expectations. When nothing happens, no one is pounding on the door. I have
a problem that users don’t report problems to me, because they feel nothing
will be done about it.”
The participants in this research study applied their experience to manage the
usability failure they encountered by using resources to analyze the failure to
determine the steps required to reduce the productivity loss due to the failure
while also mitigating the failure. The analysis of the dialogue from the
participants highlighted both support and development challenges healthcare
workers are confronted with. For example, the development challenges are
centered on the misaligned development processes employed within the
organization. The misaligned development processes chooses from a pool of
developers based on the competency level of the developer, and the project
requirements. The fallout of the “developer project selection process,” resides on
how familiar the developer assigned to the project is with the application being
developed. The misaligned support processes have been exacerbated by the
restructuring of support teams within the organization that created new support
policies that restricted support personnel access to medical center HIS.
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Additionally, removing medical centers HIS and staging them at regional data
centers that are now managed by contract personnel, has created a communication
chasm that has increased the time usability-related information systems security
failures are managed. The pattern codes of misaligned development processes,
misaligned support processes, and organizational culture, were articulated by
healthcare workers and members that supported usability failures to form the
organizational security performance impact theme.
5.3.5 Usability Assessment Theme
The final theme garnered from analyzing interview data is usability
assessment. The usability assessment theme houses the pattern codes of task
alignment assessment, technology alignment assessment, user attributes, and user
behavior. The pattern codes gleaned from the interview process elicit the role
each have on the usability assessment theme as presented by the respondents in
this study. The usability assessment theme consist of the overall user experience
before, during, and after the failure encounter occurs. The emotions of the failure
were confirmed when the participants articulated their experience while
describing the usability failure. Finger pointing, frustrations, empathy, assigning
blame assisted in developing the user behavior pattern code. The remaining
pattern codes that were formed were task alignment assessment, technology
alignment assessment, user attributes. When users in this study encountered a
usability failure, their natural instincts were to assess whether or not their task was
aligned with the technology in order to determine the root cause of the problem
and the appropriate response to the usability failure based on their circumstances.
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Based on the user attributes, which consist of experience and skill level, the user
made choices on how to manage the usability failure. The user attributes often
dictated the user behavior. Additionally, the usability assessment theme and
pattern codes afford researchers an opportunity to evaluate the actions of users
that encounter usability failures in a healthcare setting. The discussion with the
respondents reflects the captured pattern codes when the respondents’ state:
TECHC6R1, a registered nurse said: “They have had ample time to fix some
of these problems, and yet they have continued to dog that system…it is very
frustrating when you’ve done the review; you need to put it into the system to
document it. Now you can’t document the record you have obtained from the
review, because the system locks up.”
TSKC7R2, an IT specialist comments were: “I looked at the problem after it
was reported by the clinician in the test account. I tried to recreate the
problem, but was unable to do so. I was not that familiar with the problem at
the level that the error was occurring, so I had to escalate the ticket to the
national team.”
Once the user was able to complete their assessment whether there was a
“task,” failure or there was a “technology” failure with the application or system,
the user behavior shifted into determining the source of the problem
(task/technology alignment assessments) along with how to mitigate the failure.
When the participants expected the cause of the problem was not related to their
actions, a shift in behavior was detected. Five healthcare workers provided their
thoughts and emotions towards their usability failure with the following dialogue:
TECHC1R1, a program analyst stated: “None of this would be a problem if
billers and coders would do what they are supposed to do.”
TECHC3R1, a registered nurse comment was: “I was upset. I thought I had
done something wrong because I was new. I reviewed my information,
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because I had written instruction and I put all the information like I was
supposed to, so when I didn’t have the score type, I knew I had done it right.”
TSKC3R1, a registered nurse said: “I was slightly irritated, because it was a
setback as I was on a tight schedule to get something done. Since I had a
backup plan, I used the spreadsheet to complete the task.”
TSKC1R2, who is a seasoned professional stated: “I was pissed. The reason I
was upset, was the way the software is developed today is based on PMAS
and a timeline, and contracts that were not adequately made. The application
contractor’s contract ended, so they had not provided the amount of
forethought that would adequately support the release of the software.”
TSKC4R2, an IT specialist said: “The initial troubleshooting consisted of
asking HR staff to look into the old system to see how the data was displayed.
It was displayed correctly, so I looked at the data dictionary at that specific
field. The data dictionary showed that the numbers can be between 0 and
9.9999, so the root cause of the problem is percentages above 10 cannot be
displayed. The development staff needs to change that data element to
accommodate us employees, and it should be easy to do. I have no idea why
it has taken so long to fix.”
Evaluating the feedback from usability-related information system security
failures discussed by respondents has led to three possible outcomes reported by
users. The outcomes were: (a) An intervention was required by local or national
support team members, (b) the healthcare worker utilized a workaround, or (c) the
task was unable to be completed. Additionally, an intervention by local or
national support team member indicates that the user was unable to come up with
a solution for the healthcare task failure. Further, by contacting a support staff,
the member suggested that there was a time element that factored into the
intervention process. In the cases investigated, the time limit recorded to assist
the user to complete the healthcare task failure cases ranged from 2 hours to 36
hours. The temporal element within the support process, ultimately attributed to
emotional responses caused by inefficient, ineffective, and unsatisfactory
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interactions with the user interface, primarily because the healthcare workers
understood task accomplishment would be delayed.
The outcome of a usability failure whether related to a healthcare task or a
security technology failure, resulted in the healthcare worker utilizing alternative
methods such as a workaround to complete the task. Workarounds and alternative
methods were prevalent in this study. A typical workaround followed three
paths. First, the healthcare worker would use the current software application in a
different manner to produce the result expected from the original task; secondly,
the user would look to use a different application or system to produce the
expected outcome; and, thirdly, the healthcare worker would revert to a manual
process by using paper products to complete the task. While discussing
workarounds, it was confirmed that workarounds were limited to routine
tasks. Furthermore, the use of workarounds and alternative methods presents a
separate layer of challenges, such as the time required to complete the newly used
task, the communication required throughout the organization to ensure all
healthcare workers exposed of healthcare task failures use the same process, and
to minimize information risk implied by the use of a new process.
When healthcare workers did not have alternative methods in which to choose
from, their task was unable to be completed. While the sound of the healthcare
worker’s inability to complete the task was reverberating throughout the
organization, the effect of a healthcare worker’s inability to complete a task was
not always immediately known. However, there was a high probability based on
the data collected that non-routine tasks were unable to be completed due to
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access and skillset (user attributes) required to support the application and
systems, as well as the limited troubleshooting capability of the web-based
applications and systems the organization has integrated into its architecture. The
pattern codes presented in the usability assessment theme are task alignment
assessment, technology alignment assessment, user attributes, and user behavior
of healthcare workers. The conversations with the respondents demonstrated
usability-related information systems security failure created an internal process
where the user assessed whether or not they executed the task correctly, if the task
failure was not attributed to a user error, a process of troubleshooting the problem
ensued. The more difficult the task accomplishment became, the more emotional
the user became as they described their interaction with the usability failure.
Hence, the development of the usability assessment theme, which encompasses
the user attributes and interaction with a usability failure throughout the usability
failure process.
5.3.6 Impact Analysis on Task Accomplishment
Healthcare tasks were compartmentalized into routine and non-routine tasks.
A routine healthcare task is characterized by a task that users are adept at
completing, and typically has a repetitive or intuitive nature to them, which allows
for the creation of workarounds when roadblocks are encountered from task
failures. Non-routine tasks required the use of multiple applications or systems
(interdependence) to execute a task to completion. The difference between the
two task types meant an additional strategy and user interaction existed as a nonroutine task often depended on the operation of additional resources in order to
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function properly. Non-routine task were the tasked that created both intervention
from national support teams and development staff personnel.
The interventions were primarily of a temporal nature that had a certain level
of complexity based on communication challenges with support staff in the
organization. The communication and support challenges centered on the
structure of the organization, how usability failures were reported, and who had
access to the support tools to add the essential troubleshooting and resolution
information. During the interview process several respondents stated that they did
not have access to the usability failure reporting tool, therefore the level of
interaction was resigned to communicating with the support staff using email
messages. In the cases investigated, the time limit recorded to assist the user to
complete the healthcare task failure cases ranged from 2 hours to 36 hours.
Among the 16 usability failure cases investigated, 86% of the cases have not been
resolved. The open usability-related information systems security failures cases
suggest that an information system security risk currently exist, and can be
directly linked to the identified usability failures. The dialogue of the last entry
placed on October, 2012, of a reported usability failure TSKC2 studied had the
following entry: “This ticket is still a valid issue, do not close.” Based on the
communications and support challenges, the organization support practices are at
best inefficient, and at worse have contributed to misaligned support processes.
The entry above is used to prevent a reported usability-information system
security failure case to be closed without the failure being addressed by the
development staff. In this study the entry suggest that the organization is
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vulnerable to information risk, and key organizational staff members are not
aware of the information security threat.
The question posed from identifying and understanding usability-related
information system security failures in relation to support challenges is what does
the information mean? The challenges that healthcare workers were encountering
within the organization was linked to how software and hardware are developed
and integrated into the HIS. The healthcare organization under study
development process radically changed in 2009 the way IT projects are delivered
and managed. IT projects within this healthcare organization are required to
deliver customer-facing functionality in six months or less. Customer-facing
functionality essentially means to deliver software or hardware to healthcare
workers within a specified time frame. The system used to provide the
deliverables is the Project Management Accountability System (PMAS). PMAS
is a disciplined IT development approach that uses data collection and monitoring
tools along with business rules to produce IT functionality. In addition to using
PMAS as part of the development process, ProPath is also used and is the
companion tool to PMAS. ProPath is a process asset library that contains
information of all VA processes that are linked to development projects. ProPath
is a one-stop shop of formal approved processes, artifacts, and templates to assist
project teams in facilitating their daily work. Respondents that are IT specialist,
provided insight into how the development and implementation of software and
hardware has impacted their productivity and performance within the organization
with the following comment:
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TECHC1R2, and IT specialist stated: “The VA has gotten away from using
the knowledge and programming expertise of its people that have used and
developed software from the ground up, to now using a development system
(PMAS/ProPath) that ignores the greatest gift the VA has.”
A second statement expressed by an IT specialist from TSKC1R2 that was
investigated was:
“There are project managers, and developers that do not know the VA
process. All they know is the PMAS process, if they didn’t want to listen to
the point of view of seasoned support staff provided to assist them; they
basically missed an opportunity to use corporate knowledge.”
The security implications discovered interviewing respondents that
encountered healthcare task characteristic and security technology characteristic
usability-related information system security failures are grounded in user
behavior, credibility, economic, legal, productivity, and trust. Security comes into
question with user behavior when the healthcare worker seeks workarounds to
mitigate usability failures. Credibility, productivity, and trust issues materialized
when respondents spoke of development and support challenges from usabilityrelated information system security failures having a resolution rate of 14%.
Credibility and trust follows two paths from the healthcare worker’s perspective.
Healthcare worker’s perception is that they are losing credibility and trust from
the Veterans they are charged to serve, while also feeling the manner in which
software is developed and implemented in the organization has created credibility
and trust issues among users of the HIS. Economic and legal issues manifested
through information integrity failures where healthcare organization was unable
to bill for services rendered, while the potential legal issues were concerned with
inaccurate reporting of patient information.
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The contradiction in how healthcare workers described their information
security practices were discovered from analyzing usability-related information
system security failures. The usability-related information system security
failures were not considered an issue because technical security controls were not
compromised; therefore a reaction to mitigate the failure by security professionals
within the organization did not materialize. The non-action by security
professionals suggest information security risk exist within the organization. The
organization has strong security program that was prominently displayed in the
manner how the respondents described the processes used to secure confidential
and sensitive information. There was however, noticeable potential information
security risk stemming from the information integrity and unavailability of
applications and systems from both healthcare task characteristic and security
technology characteristic usability failures. The information security risk has
gone unrealized because (a) healthcare workers are unaware of the risk from
usability-related information systems security failures, and (b) the development
staff has not addressed the risk in resolving the reported usability failures. This
researcher postulates that by the organization’s primary focus being geared
towards technical security controls, therefore users of the HIS are unaware of the
pitfalls of using workarounds and alternative methods to accomplish a healthcare
task. Applying formal and informal security controls through security policies,
education and training, along with information security awareness has the
potential to reduce information risk as it relates to usability failures. Additionally,
the organization’s culture must be evaluated to establish the exact measures

114
required to bring awareness to the ramifications of usability failures, and how to
most effectively reduce work arounds that will ultimately reduce information risk
within the organization.
5.4 Hypotheses Testing
Hypotheses are statements in quantitative research, traditionally used in
experiments, in which the investigator makes a prediction or a conjecture about
the outcome of a relationship among attributes or characteristics (Creswell, 2012).
Contrary to Creswell’s view of how hypotheses are used, and for which research
methodology hypotheses are executed, Lee (1991) has provided a blueprint in
which hypotheses can be used in qualitative research. Qualitative research can be
executed with the same amount of analytical vigor as a quantitative study, which
is done using the positivist paradigm following the rules of natural science.
Following the rules of natural science the hypotheses under study will be satisfied
by meeting four checks: (a) falsifiability, which is detected by contradictory
observation; (b) logical consistency, which must be logically deducible from the
same premise; (c) relative explanatory power, wherein one must be able to
explain or predict the subject matter, and (d) survivability, in that the theory must
be able to survive attempts to disconfirm (Lee, 1991).
Given the application of hypothetico-deductive logic (Lee, 1991), the three
hypotheses tested can be observed by using a three-step process. The process is
prescribed by Lee as observing the major premise which is a general theory, the
minor premise which is a set of facts that describe the conditions, and the third
step is the conclusion that is predicts or hypothesizes. The major premise is TTF
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theory, which holds that, for IT to have a positive impact on individual
performance, the technology must be utilized and it must be a good fit with the
task it supports. The following are the results from hypotheses testing.
5.4.1 Hypothesis 1: Healthcare task characteristics will be associated with
Task-Technology Fit.
Healthcare tasks were parsed into routine and non-routine tasks. A routine
healthcare task is characterized as a task that healthcare workers are comfortable
and familiar with the steps required to execute the task to completion without the
need of instructions or assistance. Routine healthcare task in this study suggest
that there is a high probability that workarounds or alternative methods will be
applied to complete a task when healthcare workers encounter usability failures.
Non-routine tasks require the use of multiple applications, systems
(interdependence) or additional checklists or instructions to execute a task to
completion. The difference between the two task types lies in the strategies and
resources that must be utilized to achieve task accomplishments. Of the nine
healthcare tasks that were investigated, six were routine task, while three were
non-routine. The two major types of healthcare task failures were linked to
unexpected behavior of the software, and information integrity errors that
prevented the healthcare worker from efficiently interacting with the information.
All nine cases involved a failure in the handling or use of information. The list of
healthcare task characteristic failures cases including the category and code
selected can be viewed in table 3 (see page 60).
The arrow leading into Task-Technology Fit box (see page 33) from the
Healthcare Task Characteristic box shows hypothesis 1. A high degree of support
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requires that the codes created for the task failure category and the application
failure category codes determine the degree of TTF. There were 9 cases and 13
participants that provided data to analyze the hypothesis. There were four
interview questions developed to test hypothesis 1. The predominant code count
consisted of organization culture (13), user behavior (8), user attributes (7), and
misaligned support processes (5). The less dominant codes were misaligned
development processes (4). The minor premise and conclusion for hypothesis 1 is
below.
When the healthcare worker encountered a healthcare task failure, the
healthcare worker went through a mental checklist to determine whether the task
failure was due to negligence or the failure was a result of the application or
system failure. The manner in which the healthcare task failures were managed as
well as the manner in how the healthcare worker responded to the error was
directly connected to his or her role in the organization. The amount of
experience the healthcare worker had within the organization, along with the
amount of time spent working with the software or system comprised of user
attributes that essentially had a direct correlation to the healthcare worker’s
behavior. Healthcare workers with more than five years of experience in the
organization displayed a high level of emotion when discussing the healthcare
task failure. Healthcare workers with greater than five years of experience were
in a technology alignment assessment mode, as opposed to the healthcare workers
with less experience who were in a task alignment assessment mode. The
healthcare workers in technology alignment assessment mode were technically
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savvy; however, the healthcare worker displayed frustration, concern, and anger
while discussing the healthcare task failure. Less experienced members displayed
a sense of relief when the errors and failures were not caused by their actions.
Of the nine usability-related information systems security failure cases
investigated, six cases were routine healthcare task cases, while three were nonroutine healthcare task cases. The healthcare workers that encountered failures in
the routine cases, four were able to use workarounds to complete their task, while
two healthcare workers were unable to complete the task. Of the three nonroutine healthcare task cases, two of the healthcare workers were able to complete
their task when national support and development staff intervened, while the one
remaining healthcare task was unable to be completed by the healthcare worker.
The interactions and intervention of the healthcare task cases by support staff
members and development teams indicated that the healthcare worker
experienced major delays in accomplishing their task. Additionally, all nine
usability-related information systems security failure healthcare task cases
remains open waiting on a permanent resolution.
The results of hypothesis 1 strongly suggest that an association exist among
healthcare task characteristic factors with TTF. This was conveyed first from the
phase one data collection process, where nine cases were presented with task
failure and information integrity usability-related information security failures.
The combination organization culture, misaligned support processes, user
attributes, and user behavior pattern codes affords this research to capture and
demonstrate the total user experience while encountering a usability failure within
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the healthcare setting albeit varied based on individual ability and experience. The
identification of the source of task failures essentially shows the correspondence
of TTF; therefore, the hypothesis has been supported.
5.4.2 Hypothesis 2: Security technology characteristics will be associated
with Task-Technology Fit.
In order to understand the context in which the participants of the study
responded, there was a translation of terms required to satisfy testing of
hypothesis two. A security technology characteristics construct is expressed by
the use of the HIS. The HIS consists of hardware, software, and data. To ground
an HIS into the context of security protection, the terms were further linked to
potential threats to a HIS according to Dhillon (2007): (a) data modification, (b)
destructions, (c) disclosure, (d) interception, (e) interruption, and (f) fabrication.
The list of security technology characteristic failures cases including the category
and code can be viewed in table 4 (see page 62).
The arrow leading from the Security Technology Characteristic into TaskTechnology Fit box (see page 33) displays hypothesis 2. A high degree of
support requires that the codes created for the systems production and the systems
reliability categories will determine the degree of TTF. There were 6 cases and
11 participants that provided data by which to analyze the hypothesis. Four
interview questions were developed to test hypothesis two. The predominant
code count consists of information integrity failure (6), organization culture (6),
inadequate security policies (10), technology alignment assessment (11), and user
security actions (10). The less dominate codes were misaligned development
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processes (3), and misaligned support processes (3). The minor premise and
conclusion for hypothesis 2 is below.
The threat to security was linked to the inability of healthcare workers to
update data, data inconsistencies, data storage, and data transmission
complications. To further discern the source of the failures, the participants
described their task process that provided a means for understanding the source of
the failure. The security technology failure was the malfunctioning of
computerized HIS where the task of receiving data from a database or database
repository failed to provide the healthcare worker with the expected results of the
request. The questions posed to the participants by this research study sought to
check the status and performance of their HIS, the accuracy and currency of data,
and the security measures taken to protect data and information. One hundred
percent of the respondents stated that the systems were available for use;
however, two respondents added that the system was sometimes slow. The
systems designated as slow performers were web-based applications that
connected outside of their respective medical centers. The question related to the
protection of data and information was answered by 99% of the respondents
describing the steps they used to protect information. Each respondent described
how he or she would transmit sensitive patient information to support staff
members using encrypted email. Further descriptions of protecting sensitive
information resulted in the healthcare workers describing a process of marking
out sensitive data that were not required to troubleshoot a problem. The marking
out of sensitive data eliminated the need for transmitting data via encrypted email.
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The respondents conveyed that only information that was required to troubleshoot
the problem was released to support staff personnel.
There was one outlier response to protection of sensitive information. One
respondent described his frustration of working with private support contractors
that do not have the ability to receive sensitive information to provide the
necessary support. The respondent stated that there are private contractor support
staff personnel who have not received background checks; therefore, they do not
have the credentials or ability to access sensitive information within the
organization. The result of this problem has limited the ability of organization
employees to openly communicate with the private support contractors about
security technology failures.
The primary causes of security technology failures were databases and data
repositories providing duplicate, inconsistent, and inaccurate data. One of the
respondents stated that 7 out of 10 attempts accessing her database would yield
the information she asked for, while a second respondent stated that an individual
record may be accurate, but, when she “attempts to run an aggregate report or a
collection of records, the process fails.” There was also a case failure that
reported data inaccuracies due to the discovery of an algorithm that was
miscalculating a data element that actually created the transmission and use of the
wrong data.
Hypothesis 2 had strong results in the area of inadequate security policies,
technology alignment assessment, and user security actions. The healthcare
workers described how well they followed organizational security policies in the
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manner in which each healthcare worker engaged in good user security practices.
However, the technical security failures in terms of the manner in which
healthcare workers were not receiving the data as requested are essentially an
information integrity issue which weakens security within the organization.
Therefore, the conclusion found a reduction in security technology characteristics
that created an association with TTF, hence resulting in a supported hypothesis.
5.4.3 Hypotheses 3: Task-Technology Fit is associated with HIS Security
Performance Impact.
The HIS security performance impact construct is understood from the
combination of healthcare task characteristic and security technology
characteristic constructs to determine the impact on performance. The
amalgamation of healthcare task and HIS security technology failure data was
analyzed to determine the impact. To understand the HIS security impact,
additional interview questions were added asking the respondents to describe their
specific usability-related failure case and impact. With the combination of all
cases being used in the analysis of both the task characteristic and technology
characteristic usability failures, the major themes that were generated from pattern
coding are used to measure hypothesis 3.
The arrow leading from Task-Technology Fit box (see page 33) to HIS
Security Performance Impact box displays hypothesis 3. A high degree of
support requires that the pattern codes created for the information security threat,
organizational security performance impact, and the usability assessment themes
determine the degree of HIS Security Performance Impact. A total of 22
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respondents answered the questions involving the 15 usability cases investigated.
Nine cases were healthcare task characteristic failures, while six were HIS
security technology characteristic failures. Additionally, the total number of
pattern codes from the three major themes was combined to accurately present the
number of responses recorded. The information security threat theme had 26
responses, the organizational security performance impact theme had 36, and
usability assessments had 33. The results of the data analysis process are
reflected below. The theme code count exceeded the number of respondents due
to some of the responses overlapping theme groups.
Of the 22 respondents who described the impact of their usability failure, two
stated the failure did not negatively impact them from completing their task, nor
was the impact of any concern. One respondent commented that, given the
experienced and flexible staff, which was amenable to adjusting to the usability
failure, the staff adjusted by seeking a temporary solution within minutes of the
failure. A second respondent suggested that, although the failure was an issue,
having an alternative plan to complete the task allowed the failure to not pose a
problem or require the need to focus on the failure. However, ninety percent of
the respondents described negative HIS security performance impact.
Ninety percent of the respondents described the HIS security performance
impact affecting them in terms of user behavior, credibility, economic, legal,
productivity, and trust. The aforementioned terms are the fallout from the
information security threat, organizational security performance impact, and
usability assessment themes respectively. Several healthcare workers described
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their usability failure encounter by stating they were angry, frustrated, and
concerned when discovering their failure, which also included assigning blame
for the cause of the failures. Another segment of the respondents discussed how
usability failures have the potential of creating economic and legal issues if
medical records are audited when medical error cases are investigated. One of the
respondents described that inaccurate data from databases can affect the
accreditation of clinical offices that are responsible to providing spinal care
treatment and recovery services to veterans. Inaccurate data also had negative
economic consequences when a program error mislabeled data, preventing
medical organizations from billing insurance companies for the services provided
by medical centers. Trust, credibility and productivity were discussed when one
respondent stated that a new system mandated by Congress to eliminate fraud and
create transparency had increased her department’s workload by 400%.
Additionally, productivity issues were evident in 86% of the cases primarily due
to the cases left unresolved. In essence, the healthcare workers continue to seek
permanent solutions to their reported usability failure; however, workarounds and
task failure mitigation is the standard approach to manage said failures.
The results of hypothesis 3 suggest that Task-Technology Fit correlates with
HIS Security Performance Impact. Based on the results, the hypothesis was
supported. This conclusion was provided by analyzing the pattern codes, major
themes, and the terms that emulsified while gaining a true picture of the impact
from both task characteristic and technology characteristic usability-related
information systems security failures. The six attributes of user behavior,
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credibility, economic, legal, productivity, and trust are sustainable when seeking
to identify, understand, and reduce the nature and type of usability-related
information security failures within this organization.
5.5 Summary
This chapter consisted of completing the phase two data collection and data
analysis process. The process consisted of categorizing usability failures into a
task and technology characteristic case groupings. Once the case groupings were
established, pools of participants were interviewed to discuss their specific
usability failure. The data collected from the interviews were analyzed using 12
interview questions. Information garnered from the interview process led to a
need to evaluate the development process to reduce information risk from
usability-related information system security failures. Additionally, the impact of
task and technology failures had a pronounced impact on the area of user behavior
and productivity, and on the organizational front, trust, credibility, legal, and
economic impacts were expressed as factors that negatively impacted HIS
security performance.
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Chapter 6
Discussion
6.1 Introduction
The research focuses on understanding usability-related information systems
security failures in a healthcare organization and how such failures impact IS
security performance. This research study examined the nature and types of
usability failures as a method to reduce usability-related information security
failures within a healthcare organization. In order to execute this feat, the
usability failures had to first be identified. Jacobson et al. (1999) described the
nine types of usability failures that were covered in chapter 2, while Skov and
Stage (2005) described usability failures through the use of a concept tool that
categorizes usability failures as critical, serious, or cosmetic. Usability problems
and failures are also identified through usability evaluation methods; however,
usability evaluation methods cannot be compared reliably because of a lack of a
standard criterion to measure and quantify usability, as well as not having a
standard, stable process to follow (Hartson et al., 2001). Identifying a usability
problem or failure simply is not enough; in fact, it is insufficient. According to
Wixon (2003), usability practitioners must be able to explain them, understand
what they involve, and how can they be fixed.
6.2 Findings
The argument presented in the first chapter states to reduce usability security
failures, organizations must align security technology with tasks performed by
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healthcare workers and ensure such alignment does not hamper security
performance in a healthcare organization. Moreover, this research postulates that
the actions of the healthcare workers by using workarounds to mitigate usabilityrelated information systems security failures has rendered the organization’s
information assets vulnerable to information security risk. The research problem
has led to two research questions: What are the nature and types of usabilityrelated information systems security failures in a HIS? How does usabilityrelated information systems security failures impact task accomplishment in a
healthcare setting?
The first key finding was in the discovery, identification, and reporting of
usability failures by the healthcare workers. A high number of usability failures
were identified through the analysis of data and information by the healthcare
worker after the task had completed. In essence, the user interface did not alert
the healthcare worker that the application or system did not effectively,
satisfactorily, or efficiently process the request. It was in fact the actions of the
users that were central to beginning the understanding and remediation of
healthcare task failures.
The second key finding is related to how a healthcare task failure affects the
actions of the healthcare worker. Among healthcare task failures, routine
healthcare task failures created the highest opportunity for healthcare workers to
use workarounds or alternative methods to complete a healthcare task after a
failure was encountered. In this study, workaround and alternative methods to
complete a healthcare task opens the organization up to information risk. Non-
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routine healthcare task failures, and technology failures often required
intervention by support staff members or application developers, therefore,
healthcare workers were less apt to subvert security controls, while providing
application developers greater opportunities to mitigate information risk in the
development process.
The third key finding was the identification and understanding the nature of
usability-related information systems security failures. Usability-related
information systems security failures are information integrity errors and the
unavailability of application and systems to healthcare workers. During the
analysis of task-related and technology-related usability failures, the root cause of
usability-related information systems security failures were discovered by
combining the definition of task-related and technology-related usability failures
along with the information security failures. The combination of healthcare task
failures, technology failures, usability failures, and security failures transformed
the aforementioned failures into usability-related information systems security
failures.
The fourth key finding was through the identification of the nature and types
of usability-related information system security failures created a method to
identify misaligned healthcare task with the technology currently being developed
and implemented in a healthcare setting. Additionally, the method used to capture
misaligned healthcare task with the technology also has led to identifying and
understanding the impact a healthcare task failure and security technology failure
negatively impacts security performance with the HIS. The impact security
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performance has on the HIS is realized through user behavior, credibility,
economics, litigation, productivity, and trust.
The fifth key finding consisted of discovering how to reduce usability-related
information systems security failures in the healthcare organization. There is a
direct correlation between healthcare task failures and the technology used in this
healthcare setting as it relates to HIS security performance. By adapting a method
within the development process that targets the information integrity errors along
with the causes of unavailable systems provides flexibility to reduce usability
failures from misaligned healthcare task and technology failures while increasing
security performance in the organization.
6.3 Discussion of Findings
This section discusses case study phase one data collection and data analysis
along with case study phase two data collection and data analysis process.
6.3.1 Case Study Phase One Discussion
Evaluating the usability of applications and systems in the healthcare context
proved fruitful by isolating healthcare tasks along with the technology used,
provided a channel to evaluate the effectiveness, efficient, and satisfaction of the
task (ISO 9241-11, 1998). When healthcare workers were unable to effectively,
efficiently, and satisfactorily complete their task; a usability failure existed and
was reported by healthcare workers.
Based on the nine types of usability failures described by Jacobson et al.
(1999), six types—(a) the user articulates a goal and cannot succeed in attaining
it, (b) the user explicitly gives up, (c) the user articulates a goal and has to try a
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different method to find a solution, (d) the user produces a result different from
the task given, (e) the user expresses surprise, (f) the user expresses some
negative affect or says something is a problem—were presented in this study,
therefore aligning with usability research. Additionally, to further classify the
gravity of usability failures, in this study all 15 cases of usability failures were
classified as critical or serious following the failure taxonomy used by (Skov &
Stage, 2005).
The discovery of usability failures were identified by using TTF theory as a
guide. The usability failures were placed in two categories based on whether the
usability failures were task-related or technology-related. Task failures were
further classified as non-technical information security failures while technology
failures were classified as technical information security failures. From the
usability failure categories, it was discovered that the root cause of the failure
were due to information integrity failures and the unavailability of applications
and systems. The information integrity and unavailability of application and
systems were identified and understood to be the nature of usability-related
information systems security failures. Information integrity failures are directly
associated with DQ and IQ errors that further established a relationship for the
identified usability failures. The unavailability of an application or system
equates to the unavailability of information to the healthcare worker in this study.
Both information integrity and the unavailability of information is an information
security requirement; therefore the integrity of information along with
unavailability of said information is an information security failure.
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This research discovered that the healthcare worker’s ability to complete a
task was related to the quality of information returned while interacting with the
HIS. The testing of the TTF theory resulted in (a) the original task can be
completed by the healthcare worker without full dependency of the technology,
and (b) individual performance is not a factor in measuring TTF within this study.
Historical data, manual processes, access to multiple non-primary software
application and systems have been used to assist healthcare workers in completing
a task when confronted with a task failure. Also, in this study, the individual
performance level was negated primarily by this study focusing on usabilityrelated information systems security failures that required an intervention. This
approach essentially eliminated measuring individual performance which is often
attributed and measured in similar studies that use TTF theory. The use of TTF
theory provides a single focus by creating a pathway to identify a non-technical
usability failure and follow its path throughout the failure cycle to determine the
cause and impact. An interesting aspect of task-related usability-related
information system security failures within a healthcare organization requires
additional investigation due to the mitigating circumstances of such failures in a
healthcare organization. The mitigating circumstances are the workarounds that
are available to healthcare workers.
Healthcare workarounds are prevalent within this study, particularly when
healthcare workers encounter a task-related usability failure. In healthcare
literature, workarounds have been researched from various perspectives using the
tools clinicians and healthcare workers use; however, according to Halbesleben et
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al. (2008), there is a lack of theoretically grounded and empirically tested
understanding of the causes of workarounds and their impact from an HIS. This
researcher likewise suggests that workarounds, particularly in this study, are used
to get around a problem rather than displaying defiance or opposition.
Additionally, hospitals view workarounds as an evasion of standardized routines
that the hospitals insist save patient lives and safeguard hospital financial
resources (Halbesleben et al., 2008), while healthcare employees believe
workarounds increase their performance and patient safety (Beaudoin & Edgar,
2003). Workarounds are part of the culture of healthcare organizations primarily
to thwart the unavailability of technology. However, that does not preclude the
creation of answers to resolve workarounds as suggested by (Halbesleben et al.
2008; Yang, Ng, Kankanhalli, & Yip, 2012).
This research has established that usability failures, task failures, and
technology failures can be addressed by analyzing the dialogue of healthcare
workers when usability failures are reported. This approach is significant in the
area of usability, as usability research primarily evaluates usability empirically
during the testing or implementation stages of the usability development process
(Akers et al., 2012). The research approach in this study has empirically
evaluated usability failures by focusing on task and technology to determine the
true user experience while applications and systems are currently used in the
organization. Additionally, by analyzing the information provided by users of an
HIS after usability failures are reported, further allows the capturing of additional
usability failures that are not detected from the interaction with the user interface.
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6.3.2 Case Study Phase Two Discussion
The behavior of healthcare workers was manifested by their response to the
usability failures they encountered. The behavior was voiced in frustration, anger,
lack of production, trust, credibility, and empathy due to the failures, suggests that
this research should follow the results of said behavior through the actions of the
users. The usability failures have led to healthcare workers employing
workarounds to complete their task. According to Post and Kagan (2006),
employees in an organization are more likely to bypass security measures in order
to complete a task. In a healthcare organization where task completion can be life
or death, healthcare workers will seek alternative methods to complete a task.
Healthcare workers are driven to complete their task; therefore, in this study, the
line of examination is to determine the type of threat existing from healthcare
workers using workarounds to complete their task, particularly given the level of
frustration and anger that goes along with the failure.
The behavior of users in relation to protecting information and information
systems assets are covered by (Fagnot, 2008; Stanton et al., 2006). Two streams
of information security research that addresses user behavior are
counterproductive computer usage (Stanton, 2002; Weatherbee, 2010) and insider
threat (Post & Kagan, 2006; Siponen & Willison, 2009). Counterproductive
computer usage consists of a computer user in an organization that exposes the
information assets to risk or liability or a loss of productivity time by engaging in
activities that are counter to established computer resource usage policies
(Ifinedo, 2014; Mastrangelo, Everton, & Jolton, 2006). Insider threat refers to
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intentionally disruptive, unethical, or illegal behavior enacted by individuals who
possess substantial internal access to the organization’s information assets
(Stanton et al., 2005). The challenge presented from these two streams of
research along with the information from this study suggests that the users of the
HIS are not involved in intentional or unintentional security policy violation;
therefore, how does user behavior get addressed when the organizational
information security policies are not knowingly violated, although a potential
threat exists? The answer was not forthcoming from Crossler et al. (2013),
although the researchers made an effort to move behavioral information security
research forward by separating insider deviant behavior from insider misbehavior;
however, neither example nor definition applies to the healthcare worker.
A conceivable solution is to address user behavior through security training
and awareness. Healthcare workers are unaware of the effects circumventing
healthcare task failures through workarounds have on organizational security.
Also, organizational managers have not yet understood the magnitude usability
failures have on the organization, primarily because user security is managed
through the technical view; therefore organizational managers are more concerned
with security failures that are derived and related to technical failures. By
addressing user behavior through security training and awareness has the potential
of improving organizational security culture—thus reducing healthcare worker
workarounds.
While analyzing the impact of usability-related information systems security
failures, there were findings discovered from the interview process that required
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addressing. The research uncovered that usability-related information systems
security failures highlighting the impact of misaligned task and technology have
on an organization. The main areas impacted in the organization were economic,
legal, trust, and credibility. The recognition of the impact was expressed from
feedback healthcare workers experienced while working with the organization
customers, as well as from the results of organizational policy changes including
the motivation and implementation of new software applications and systems.
The credibility, economic, legal, and trust fallout materializes through the
organizational security performance impact theme. Based on such “impact
attributes” discussed, the overarching domain in which the attributes should be
addressed is through software development.
The fallout of usability-related information security failures provided the
foundation for understanding the security implications from the failures.
Healthcare workers that encountered usability failures whether task-related or
technology-related had an emotional reaction to the failure. The emotional
reaction contributed to workarounds in this study, along with the reluctance to
report usability-related information systems security failures. The security
implications of the user reactions are violation of the organization security
policies. This researcher postulates the actions of the healthcare workers to use
workarounds mitigating usability-related information systems security failures has
rendered the organization’s information assets vulnerable to information security
risk.
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The organization security implications are derived from how the
organization’s inability to identify, understand, and address usability-related
information systems security failures. The healthcare organization under study
primarily used technical security controls to protect its information assets.
Technical security controls are visible throughout the organization in the
organization security program to include the development process. The
development process security-related artifacts uses access controls as the primary
focus to protect information assets. Researchers (Baskerville, 1993; Straub &
Welke, 1998; Dhillon & Backhouse, 2001) have gone on record stating IS
security can be more effectively managed if the emphasis goes beyond the
technical means of protecting information resources. With the healthcare
organization development process focus being on the technical view, the user
viewpoint and role in the organization suffers.
Siponen (2002) suggested that organizations that employ the technical view
ensure users can understand and follow their security mission easily, however at
worst the user will not understand the relevance of security actions which will
result in the users actions to be enforced or transition in the right direction.
Moreover, the organization had a clear variance practices in the development
process between newly developed software and software that required patching
through maintenance. Software that required maintenance was the usabilityrelated information security failures under study. Evaluating the communication
history from development staff, reflect that there was not on-going
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communication established that provided opportunities to address usabilityrelated information security failures in the development process.
The question posed while addressing the research questions was how does
user behavior get addressed when the organizational security policies are not
knowingly violated, although a potential information threat exist from the fallout
of usability-related information systems security failures? To begin to address the
root cause of usability-related information system security failures is to evaluate
the organization’s development process. The development staff must first
understand the impact of information integrity failures and the unavailability of
applications and systems have on information security along with the users of the
HIS. Additionally, both organization leadership and the development staff must
recognize that usability failures are directly associated with information security
failures and ultimately threatens the security of information resources.
Based on the organization under study primarily using a technical view to
execute information security in the organization to include the methods used in
the development process to address and reduce usability-related information
systems security failures can be done in the development process. The
organization currently uses a rigid IT development process of PMAS and ProPath
that seeks to meet the needs of the customers by producing IT products through
communications and timelines. The development process uses a process
management approach that all project management and development team
members follow. Incorporating the meta-notation framework proposed by
Siponen et al. (2006) that provides the opportunity to incorporate security
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requirements in the design phase aligns with the current development method and
processes used in the organization. A proposed process to reduce usability-related
information systems security failures consist of applying the security controls
against the identified usability-related information system security failure. This
can be done during the troubleshooting phase of the usability-related information
systems security failure; the failure will be associated with a specific application
or system. The root cause of the usability-related information systems security
failure can be modeled in the development process through PMAS and ProPath
process while repairing the reported usability failure. The organization’s help
desk repository stores a history of cradle-to-grave communications on all usability
failures. The information from the help desk repository is the catalyst to reduce
usability-related information systems security failures by analyzing the
information specific to task-related and technology-related failures to ensure
alignment between the task and technology. Tracing the source of usability
failures through the help desk repository improves application and system usage,
while also improving information security within the organization.
6.4 Summary
This chapter addressed and discussed the finding of the two research questions
along with the results of the hypotheses tested. The findings were
compartmentalized by case study phase one, and case study phase two of the data
collection and data analysis process. The findings for case study phase one
process found that the nature and types of usability-related information systems
security failure were caused by information integrity along with the unavailability
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of applications and systems. Phase one case study also determined that usability
failures were also discovered outside of the user interface. Phase two case study
found that the organization under study primarily uses technical security controls
within the organization, therefore usability-related information failures were
confirmed not to have been addressed by (a) development staff not addressing
information integrity and application and system availability failures, (b) the
development staff not identifying and understanding the nature and types of
usability-related information system security, to include the threat the failures
have on information assets, (c) the development process varies between newly
released software and software that requires a fix, and (d) a lack of
communication between users of the software and development staff reduces the
effectiveness of the software released into the field. To address usability-related
information systems security failures, a non-technical approach should be applied
throughout the organization. A non-technical approach has the potential to
address the healthcare organization culture of using workarounds when task and
technology is found to be misaligned, thus creating usability-related information
systems security failures.
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Chapter 7
Conclusion
7.1 Introduction
In this chapter, a summary of the research findings are presented and the
hypotheses tested, along with the goals of the study. Additionally, the limitations,
implications of the study for research and industry, along with future research
opportunities are covered. Future research recommendations have the opportunity
to forge a stronger link between the usability, information security, and healthcare
communities by better aligning healthcare task with the technology used while
reducing information risk when usability failures occur.
7.2 Findings Summary
This research sought to identify and understand the nature and types of
usability-related information systems security failures within a healthcare context.
There were five key findings that were unveiled. The first finding was in the
discovery, identification, and reporting of usability failures by the healthcare
workers. The second finding was related to how a healthcare task failure affects
the actions of the healthcare worker. The third finding was the identification and
understanding the nature of usability-related information systems security
failures. The fourth finding was creating a method to identify misaligned
healthcare task with the technology currently being developed and implemented
in a healthcare setting from identified usability failures. The fifth finding
consisted of discovering how to reduce usability-related information systems
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security failures in the healthcare organization. By adapting a method within the
development process that targets the information integrity errors along with the
causes of unavailable systems provides flexibility to reduce usability failures from
misaligned healthcare task and technology failures while increasing security
performance in the organization.
The discovery of the five findings required a translation of usability,
healthcare, and information security terms in order to create a usability failure
taxonomy to appropriately examine the failures. The taxonomy allowed the
discovery that the task-related and technology-related usability failures were
misaligned and ultimately caused information integrity and the unavailability of
applications and systems. The failures the healthcare workers were encountering
led to creating workarounds in order to complete their task. In the evaluation of
the usability-related information systems security failures, it was clear that nontechnical information security controls would be most effective in an effort to
reduce the failures. The organization uses a technical view to implement their
organization security program which carries over to how software is developed
and maintained in the organization. Leveraging the information and dialogue
from reported usability-related information systems security failures and applying
the information to the organization’s development process have the potential of
reducing information security risk in the organization.
7.3 Limitations
This research study had four limitations. The first limitation is that this
research study was conducted within a large government healthcare organization

141
that has an integrated HIS that interconnects with 128 medical centers around the
United States. The organization uses a combination of proprietary and
nonproprietary software to include disparate, heterogeneous, and autonomous
systems. The architecture used, along with the organization composition, may
impact generalizability. A second limitation was the usability case study selection
process. Systematic sampling was used to select the cases along with the
candidates for the study. The cases selected required a candidate to volunteer to
participate, which ultimately reduced the case and candidate pool. The third
limitation was the temporal aspects surrounding usability-related information
system security failures that were analyzed. The average case analyzed was two
years old from the original date the failure was reported. Although there was an
abundance of information available to discuss the cases with the candidates,
several candidates were unable to recall all the details of usability-related
information system security failure at the time it happened. The final limitation
was the inability to expand the candidate pool and case selection pool to include
development staff members to participate. The development staff members are
composed of contract employees who were unable to participate due to contract
obligations. The development staff members provided an opportunity to discuss
potential security intervention controls related to the specific type of usabilityrelated information systems security failure identified. Having development staff
to participate in a similar study is a future research opportunity, primarily because
contract staff members are the staff members who most often resolve the reported
usability failures through the development process.
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7.4 Implications
This section presents the implication that this research study has for research
and industry.
7.4.1 Implications for Research
Through a unique lens, this research developed a method to identify and
understand the nature and types of usability-related information systems security
failures within an HIS. The discovery of the source of usability failures provides
an opportunity to reduce usability-related information systems security failures.
A modest amount of research has evaluated the effects a usability failure has on
information systems security, but none analyzes the alignment of healthcare task
and technology failures while seeking methods to reduce the failures.
The nature of usability security is to use technical security controls primarily
through the user interface to protect information resources. Focusing only on
technical security controls assures potential information security risk, when
researchers argue non-technical security controls are required to protect an
organization’s IS. This research has identified the root causes of usability-related
information security failures, while also providing a proven method through
secure system development that can reduce usability failures along with
improving information security failures in the organization. Researchers have
also argued for a need to address security controls through the software
development process; however, very little evidence indicates that organizations
have successfully adopted that approach.
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Lastly, TTF theory has a direct and transparent connection to both usability
and the IS Success model (Delone, 2003; Delone & McLean, 1992). The
variables of efficiency, effectiveness, and satisfaction have the requisite elements
to form a relationship for academic research in the domains of IS security,
usability, and healthcare. The relationship can be used to create a diagnostic tool
to address breakdowns in processes that affect information security, usability, and
healthcare work processes.
7.4.2 Implications for Industry
The implications of this research for industry serve the usability, security, and
healthcare communities respectively. Within the usability community,
practitioners are often charged with explaining usability problems to include
understanding what the problem involves, and how the problem can be fixed.
This also holds true for the security community. This research provides a proven
process that explains who, what, when, how, and why a usability-related
information systems security occurred in the organization and the ramifications of
said failure. Within the healthcare community, this research provides a novel way
of identifying the misalignment of a healthcare task with the technology used to
mitigate information risk particularly when users of the HIS begin to use
workarounds when usability failures occur.
7.4.3 Future Research
This research used grounded theory techniques based on anecdotal terms used
by the healthcare organizations to report usability failures, along with terms that
defined the CIA triad and TTF theory. This method allowed the identification of
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the nature and types of usability-related information systems security failures that
occur in a large healthcare organization. The identification of the aforementioned
failures has led to future research opportunities.
One research opportunity is to extend this study by analyzing the usability
related information system security failures after the development staff adds their
intervention to resolve the failure. Evaluating the intervention provided by the
development staff will allow this current research study to be extended by
accurately diagnosing and recalibrating usability failure interventions to reduce
usability-related information system security failures in the healthcare setting.
Integrating such a resolution provides an opportunity to involve all parties to
create solutions to usability failures, improve healthcare work processes, and
apply security controls in the areas where vulnerabilities are discovered.
Moreover, this approach provides an opportunity to bridge the desired link
identified in literature between the healthcare, information security, and usability
research communities respectively.
A second research opportunity is to combine the TTF theory with IS Success
(Delone, 2003; Delone & McLean, 1992) to evaluate an organization’s security
program. Applying the independent construct of IQ from the IS Success model
with the TTF theory allows a focus on the individual user, the task, and
technology to determine the information risk that exists within an organization.
An alternative research opportunity is to use the current research model (fit focus)
in this study, or apply the Technology-to-Performance Chain (TPC) research
model (Goodhue & Thompson, 1995, p. 216) in figure 9 comprised of the TTF
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theory to generalize the current study by applying quantitative methods to analyze
usability-related information security failures in non-healthcare settings. By
applying the individual characteristic construct (TPC model) to analyze usabilityrelated information systems security failures focuses on usability failures that did
not require an intervention by development staff. Therefore casting a wider net to
capture, identify, and understand the nature and types of usability failures along
with the impact created within an organization.

Figure 9. Technology-to-Performance Chain Model
7.5 Summary
This research study examined identified usability-related information systems
security failures within a healthcare organization. The identified failures were
then categorized based on task-related and technology-related usability failures.
The taxonomy of usability failures provided the foundation to determine how to
mitigate the actions of users based on the root cause of the problem. The aim of
this research was to identify and enhance the understanding of usability-related
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security failures and how the failures impact IS security performance in a
healthcare organization. Through a qualitative positivist case study, the goals of
this research study were obtained.
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Appendix A
Task-technology Fit Dimensions and Final 8 Factors
Table 7
Results of Factor Analysis : 16 Original Task-Technology Fit Dimensions and
8 Final Task-Technology Fit Factors
8 Final TTF Factors
16 Original TTF Dimensions
Cronbach's Alpha
(After poor questions dropped)
Quality
Currency of the data
0.84
Right data is maintained
Right level of detail
Locatability
Locatability
0.75
Meaning of data is easy to find out
Authorization
Authorization for access to data
0.6
Compatibility
Data compatibility
0.7
Ease of Use/Training Ease of Use
0.74
Training
Production
Production Timeliness
0.69
Timeliness
Systems Reliability
Systems Reliability
0.71
Relationship with
IS understanding of business
0.88
Users
IS interest and dedication
Responsiveness
Delivering agreed-upon solutions
Technical and business planning
assistance
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Appendix B
Phase One Data Collection Search Terms
Table 8

Phase 1 Data Collection Keyword Search Terms
Search Phase
Key Word Search Terms
Anecdotal Search Access
Connections
Denied
Phase One
Denied
Failures
Interfaces
Interactions
Unable to
Login
Permissions
Access
User errors
User Preferences Verify
Axial Coding
Access
Search Phase
Bypass
Context
Violations
Two
Dropped
Locked
Display
Connection
Record
User
Complaints
TTF (Task
Characteristic)
Authorized
Changed
Bad Data
Search Phase
Access
Data
Three
Data
Data Quality
Ease of Use
Compatibility
Locate Data
Misplaced Data Missing Data
System
System Conflict System Crash
Compatibility
System
Training
Failure
TTF (Technology
Characteristic)
IS
Delays
Flexible
Search
Relationships
Phase Three
Production
Operations
Production
Lag
Production
Scheduled
System
Timeliness
Operations
Reliability
Unreliable

Disconnect
Kajee
Usability
Vista Link
Continuous
Connections
Security

Data

Hard to Use
Quality
System Down

No Response
Production
Slow
Unavailable
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Appendix C
Usability Failure Semi-structured Interview Questions
Table 9
Interview Questions with Mapping to Research Measures
Research Questions Factors/Focus
Interview Questions
Research Question
IS Security/Usability
Describe your thoughts and
Two
reaction once the failure
occurred while using the
system?
Research Question
IS Security/Usability
Did the task or process design
Two
factor into the application or
system failure?
Research Question
IS Security/Usability
What steps or alternative
Two
methods did you take to
complete your task?
Hypothesis One
Healthcare Task
Were you able to complete the
Characteristics
task? If not, how did the failure
affect your ability to
accomplish the task?
Hypothesis Two
Security Technology
Were you able to complete the
Characteristics
task? If not, how did the failure
affect your ability to
accomplish the task?
Hypothesis Three
HIS Security
Were you able to complete the
Performance
task? If not, how did the failure
Impact
affect your ability to
accomplish the task?
Hypothesis One
Healthcare Task
How do the alternative steps
Characteristics
align with the original task
design?
Hypothesis Two
Security Technology
Is the application or system
Characteristics
readily available for use? (If
not, please explain.)
Hypothesis Two
Security Technology
Does the application or system
Characteristics
provide you accurate and
current information? (If not,
please explain.)
Hypothesis Two
Security Technology
Describe the security steps that
Characteristics
are associated with the
application/system used to
complete the task.

150
Research Questions
Hypothesis Three

Hypothesis Three

Hypothesis Three

Factors/Focus
HIS Security
Performance
Impact
HIS Security
Performance
Impact
TTF Theory

Interview Questions
What recommendations do you
have that could resolve the
failure you encountered?
How did the failure impact
task accomplishment?
Describe your experience level
with the application or system.
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Appendix D
Task Characteristic Usability Failure Sub Code List

Access denied

Application error

Personal identified information
display
Receiving confusing
information
Remote connection unavailable

Application failed

Report display data errors

Application not
responding
Application responding
slowly
Application timeout

Report generates application
errors
Report generating incorrect
information
Report generation failure

Application training
request
Applications allows
user to circumvent task
Confusing information
display
Error generating report

Sensitive information
displaying
Software forced logoff

Access violation error

Inaccurate information
display
Inconsistent
information display

Software modification request
Solicited information not
returned
System timeout issue
Unable to access system

Incorrect data display

Unable to add information

Incorrect data returned
Information is not
displaying as expected
Information missing
from display
Information missing
from report
Information not
received
New Feature Request

Unable to complete task
Unable to create report
Unable to display image
Unable to enter information
Unable to execute task
Unable to generate report

Unable to import
information
Unable to interpret
information
Unable to locate
information
Unable to log into the
system
Unable to print
information
Unable to remove
information
Unable to retrieve
information
Unable to retrieve
information
Unable to terminate
user connection
Unable to update
record
Unable to verify
information
Unsolicited
information display
Unsolicited
information
transmitted
Unsolicited removal
of information
User access violation
User training issue
User unable to
complete task
Wrong data update
Wrong information
released
Wrong information
returned
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Appendix E
Technology Characteristic Usability Failure Sub Code List

Access Violation

Database full error

Application connection
failure
Application Failure
Application timeout

System failure

Application transmitted
wrong data
Bad data display

Inaccurate data during
import
Incorrect data stored in
database
Incorrect data used in
application
Invalid data display
Missing data

Confusing data display
Corrupt report returned
Data display request
Data entry limitation
Data inconsistencies
Data mismatch
Data not received
Data not updating

Distorted image display
Duplicate data display

Network connectivity
problem
Record lock during access
Record locked
Slow system response
Software Bug

Data transmission problem Software error
Data unavailable
Software modification
request
Data validation error
System authentication
failure

System create duplicate
transmissions
System not responding
System not transmitting
System responding
slowly
System unavailable
Unable to access system
Unable to display data
Unable to display image
Unable to generate
report
Unable to receive data
Unable to store data
Unable to transfer data
Unable to transmit data
Unable to update
database
Unable to upload data
Unsolicited data display
Unsolicited data merge
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Appendix F
Theme Emergence Interview Comments from Respondents

Table 10
Theme Emergence Table
Pattern Codes
Participant's Words
User Security
"I see the potential of placing information
Actions
in the wrong record"; "We cannot always
trust our data"; "The host file is sent via
secure FTP connection"
User Security
"I am aware of privacy and security
Actions
implications when transmitting patient
information"; "Security measures are in
place" "If patient information is written
down on paper, once the use is completed,
the paper is shredded."
Support System
"There is not much troubleshooting that
Breakdowns
can be done"; "some of these problem
occurs because it is a web-based program"
Organizational
Culture Change

"I have a problem that users don’t report
problems to me, because they feel nothing
will be done about it."

User Behavior

"None of this would be a problem if billers
and coders would do what they are
supposed to do"
"I ran through the problem in our test
account";
"The initial troubleshoot I done, I asked
HR to look at the old system, and was it
displayed correctly"
"There was nothing wrong with the
ordering process, it was not a user error";
"I thought I had done something wrong
because I was new"
"I had to look at the code, and figure out
how to get this fixed"; "There is something
wrong here, because if things were
working right, I would not get this
information"

Task Assessment

Task Assessment

Technology
Assessment

Theme Emergence
Information
Security Threat

Information
Security Threat

Organizational
Security
Performance
Impact
Organizational
Security
Performance
Impact
Usability
Assessment
Usability
Assessment

Usability
Assessment

Usability
Assessment
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Appendix G
Case Study Interview Record
Table 11
Interview Record for Case Study
Date
Respondent
Start
Key
Time

End
Time

Total
Time
66

11/20/2013 TSKC1R1

3:30

4:36

11/26/2013
11/14/2013
11/15/2013
12/11/2013

12:30
10:30
9:30
1:00

2:04
11:29
10:31
1:53

TSKC1R2
TSKC2R1
TSKC2R2
TSKC3R1

11/27/2013 TSKC3R2

11/21/2013
11/15/2013
12/11/2013
11/29/2013
11/21/2013
11/21/2013
11/13/2013
11/20/2013
11/25/2013
11/27/2013
11/21/2013
12/05/2013

TSKC4R2
TSKC5R1
TSKC6R1
TSKC7R2
TSKC8R1
TSKC8R2
TSKC9R1
TECHC1R1
TECHC1R2
TECHC2R1
TECHC2R2
TECHC3R1

1:00

2:30

2:00
1:30
4:00
10:00
11:00
2:00
11:30
9:30
10:00
12:00
12:30
2:00

3:15
2:44
5:09
10:43
11:47
3:15
12:24
10:32
11:18
12:58
1:19
2:52

11/27/2013 TECHC3R2
11/15/2013 TECHC4R1

1:00
3:00

2:30
4:05

12/05/2013 TECHC42R2
12/13/2013 TECHC5R1
11/27/2013 TECHC5R2

4:00
11:00
2:00

5:45
12:00
3:15

94

Special Notes

Interactive
Interview

59
61
53

90

75
74
69
43
47
75
54
62
88
58
49
52
90
65
110
60
75

Respondent
discussed tskc3,
techc3, and
techc5
Respondent
discussed tskc4,
and techc5

Interactive
Interview

155
Date

Respondent
Key
11/14/2013 TECHC6R1

Start
Time
2:00

Total Interview Minutes
Total Number of Interviews

End
Time
2:57

Total
Time
57

Special Notes

1,626
24

Note. An interactive interview consisted of an reenactment of the reported
usability failure
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